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Summary 
Does Europe matter? This paper-based dissertation investigates to what extent 
“European factors” matter for citizens during European Parliament (EP) elec-
tions. In three original research articles, I analyze the electoral impact of individ-
ual attitudes towards the European Union (EU) and the European integration 
process, political representation on the EU integration policy dimension and the 
politicization of EU issues across different member states. The empirical analyses 
are based on the voter surveys of the European Election Studies, but also inte-
grate party-level data, such as the Euromanifesto Study. The results demonstrate 
the continuing relevance of the “second-order election” research framework for 
individual-level electoral behavior, but also illustrate various ways in which “Eu-
rope matters” for citizens’ participation and vote choice in European elections. I 
show that EP election behavior is significantly shaped by trust in European insti-
tutions, by ideological and policy-specific voter-party congruence and by the de-
gree to which European integration is politicized by political elites. These find-
ings have important implications for our understanding of present-day European 
Parliament elections and the democratic legitimacy of the European Union.  
 
Keywords: Democratic Legitimacy, EP Elections, European Integration, Euro-
scepticism, Issue Politicization, Participation, Representation, Voting Behavior  
Acknowledgments 
First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor Marc Debus for giving me the 
chance to write this thesis under his guidance, for providing me with all the free-
doms to do it independently and for always being a great source of support and 
inspiration. Moreover, I am grateful to Hermann Schmitt for involving me in the 
Euromanifesto Study of the European Election Studies 2014 at the MZES, to 
Hanspeter Kriesi for hosting me as a Visiting Fellow at the EUI and to GESIS for 
letting me write parts of this dissertation in the EUROLAB. I also want to express 
my appreciation to the countless anonymous reviewers who helped improving 
the papers developed as parts of this dissertation project as well as to my disser-
tation reviewers and committee (Harald Schoen, Thorsten Faas, Rüdiger Schmitt-
Beck) for accepting to examine this thesis and for providing valuable feedback.  
This project also benefited from the input of the research community on Euro-
pean elections and public opinion. Thanks to the financial support of the Gradu-
ate School of Economic and Social Sciences (GESS), I have been able to attend 
numerous workshops and conferences, where I presented parts of the thesis and 
received insightful comments from junior and senior scholars. Most notably, I 
thank the participants of the Winter School on Elections and Voting Behavior (2015) 
in Leuven (organized by Ruth Dassonneville and André Blais), the workshop on 
Euroscepticism and EU Politicisation in Times of Crisis (2017) in York (Sofia Vasi-
lopoulou, Liisa Talving), the session on The Political Consequences of Euroscepticism 
at the ECPR Joint Sessions (2018) in Nicosia (Catherine De Vries, Andreas Gold-
berg) and the workshop on Bringing Politics into the Study of the European Union 
(2018) in Munich (Daniela Braun, Martin Gross).  
Lastly, I feel blessed to have experienced the teaching of inspiring political scien-
tists at the Universities of Lüneburg, Mainz, Strasbourg and Mannheim (esp. Fer-
dinand Müller-Rommel, Jürgen Falter, Edeltraud Roller, Johannes Marx, Hanna 
Proner, Annette Schmitt, Kai Arzheimer, Sean Carey) in the early stages of my 
academic life. More recently, I enjoyed the company and input of my fellow PhD 
students at the GESS and my colleagues from the Chair of Comparative Govern-
ment in Mannheim. This adds to the private support of my family, friends and 
Jumi to whom I owe my deepest gratitude for being on my side.   
Contents 
 
Preface and list of publications ................................................................................. 1 
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 2 
2 Theoretical background....................................................................................... 4 
2.1 Legitimacy and democracy in the European Union ................................... 4 
2.1.1 Concepts and sources of political legitimacy ...................................... 4 
2.1.2 The legitimacy of European governance .............................................. 6 
2.1.3 The EU’s democratic deficit and the European Parliament ............ 11 
2.2 EP election theories and citizens’ electoral behavior ............................... 16 
2.2.1 The “second-order elections” framework .......................................... 16 
2.2.2 The “Europe matters” approach.......................................................... 18 
2.3 Basic research interest and hypotheses ...................................................... 23 
3 Empirical Studies ................................................................................................ 26 
3.1 Research gaps and empirical research questions ...................................... 26 
3.2 Summaries ...................................................................................................... 29 
3.3 Findings and contributions .......................................................................... 32 
4 Discussion ............................................................................................................ 36 
References .................................................................................................................... 40 
Appendix: Empirical studies .................................................................................... 59 
 
  
 
  1 
 
Preface and list of publications 
This paper-based dissertation builds on three original research articles that have 
been published in or submitted to peer-reviewed political science journals. The 
following manuscript provides an introduction, the theoretical framework, a 
summary of the contributions and a concluding discussion to the three empirical 
studies, which are listed below in the order of their publication dates.  
Study I:  Schäfer, Constantin (2017). Euroskeptizismus und Wahlenthaltung. 
Motivationen unterschiedlicher Nichtwählertypen bei der Europa-
wahl 2014. Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, 11(1), 50-
80, doi:10.1007/s12286-017-0327-z. 
Study II:  Schäfer, Constantin & Marc Debus (2018). No participation without 
representation. Policy distances and abstention in European Parlia-
ment elections. Journal of European Public Policy, 25(12), 1835-1854, 
doi:10.1080/13501763.2017.1363806. 
Study III:  Schäfer, Constantin (under review). Exit or voice? The role of politi-
cal awareness, ideological congruence and party polarization in the 
electoral behavior of Eurosceptic citizens. [published here as pre-print 
version] 
The following manuscript provides a comprehensive framework that connects 
and jointly reflects the individual articles. Since this dissertation is the product of 
several years of work (starting in late 2014), the state of research on which the 
papers draw has naturally developed since then (and so has my own thinking). 
Therefore, this framework paper also allows me to integrate more recent schol-
arly work – without being restrained by the usual word limit of journal articles. 
However, this manuscript does not serve as a substitute for the more targeted 
literature reviews, theoretical argumentations and empirical analyses of the three 
papers. Lastly, I would like to add that three more articles related to the topic 
have been published or submitted for publication during the development of this 
thesis (Schäfer 2019, Schäfer & Gross 2020, Schäfer et al. forthcoming). Yet, alt-
hough they will be referred to in the manuscript and listed in the references, they 
do not form part of this dissertation for the reason of greater coherence.  
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1 Introduction 
The recent elections to the European Parliament (EP) in 2019 have surprised 
many political observers. For the first time since 1979, overall voter turnout in-
creased and was the highest in the past 25 years (50.6 %). This boost in turnout – 
an increase of around eight percentage points compared to 2014 – was observed 
in 20 of the 28 EU member countries without any geographical pattern. Notwith-
standing the country-specific variations, many analysts attribute this dramatic 
increase in electoral participation to the higher politicization of EP elections (De 
Sio et al. 2019: 64) and see it as a sign of increasing legitimacy of EU governance 
(Tallberg 2019: 13). However, many mainstream centrist parties experienced sig-
nificant vote losses, whereas EU-critical parties consolidated their presence in the 
EP and even slightly increased their seat share (~30 %) compared to the previous 
legislature (Brack 2019: 64). Nevertheless, although Eurosceptic parties domi-
nated the election in several member states, they did not experience another ma-
jor breakthrough as in the previous EP election in 2014 (Wilhelm 2019) that had 
been described as “Eurosceptic” or “political earthquake” by media outlets 
across Europe.1  
In fact, the strong surge in Euroscepticism – both in public opinion and voting 
behavior – had been the major theme of the 2014 EP election (Nielsen & Franklin 
2017), alongside with a historically low voter turnout (42.6 %) and an increasing 
importance of EU issues during the election campaign. Prior to the 2014 EP elec-
tion, the EP itself had announced that “this time it’s different”, mainly because 
European level parties presented top candidates for the European Commission 
presidency in order to strengthen the electoral connection between citizens and 
the EU executive and to increase democratic legitimacy. In hindsight, however, 
this “Spitzenkandidaten system” had limited effects on both party strategies as 
well as voting behavior (see, e.g., Quinlan & Okolikj 2016, Braun & Popa 2018). 
The remarkable differences from earlier EP elections turned out to be others: after 
several years of economic crisis in Europe – commonly called the “Euro crisis” – 
many citizens expressed discontent with the EU and its crisis management at the 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., the British BBC, the French Le Figaro or the Spanish El Mundo.  
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ballot boxes, which led some observers to the conclusion that “for the first time, 
these elections were clearly ‘about Europe’” (Russo et al. 2019: 9). Most notably, 
the campaign and public debates were “strongly framed as a contest between 
parties wanting more Europe vs. parties wanting less Europe” (Thomassen 2016: 
546). Interestingly, this observation runs counter to the “second-order elections” 
assumptions that researchers traditionally use to explain electoral behavior in 
European elections (Reif & Schmitt 1980), but lends support to scholars who 
claim that “Europe matters” in present-day EP elections (Hobolt 2015). 
The debate between these two camps and its implications for the democratic le-
gitimacy of the EU provides the theoretical framework of this paper-based dis-
sertation. Analyzing the character of contemporary EP elections is of crucial im-
portance for the legitimacy of EU governance, because without European issues 
playing a role for parties and voters, EP elections can hardly fulfil their legitimiz-
ing function for the European political system. To put it bluntly, my main re-
search interest therefore lies in the question how and to what extent “Europe” 
actually mattered for citizens in the 2014 European elections. More specifically, I 
analyze the electoral effects of individual orientations towards the EU and the 
European integration process. By doing so, I am particularly interested in how 
the relationship between attitudes and EP election behavior is conditioned by the 
degree to which EU issues are politicized in the different EU member states, es-
pecially as a consequence of the Euro crisis.  
This dissertation consists of three empirical studies that address the research 
questions laid out above. Before presenting these studies, I provide the reader 
with the theoretical background that underlies the research interest in citizen at-
titudes towards European integration and EP election behavior in the next sec-
tion (2). The subsequent section (3) then discusses the empirical studies and their 
contributions to the literature, before the concluding section (4) reflects implica-
tions, limitations and avenues for further research. Appended to these introduc-
tory chapters are the copies of the three articles that have been published in (or 
submitted to) peer-reviewed political science journals. 
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2 Theoretical background 
The theoretical framework of this dissertation integrates several streams of aca-
demic literature, which build the foundation for the research interest in citizens’ 
attitudes towards European integration and their behavior in European Parlia-
ment elections. Therefore, the following section is primarily concerned with con-
ceptions of legitimacy and democracy at the European level (2.1), before discuss-
ing the contested nature of contemporary EP elections and its implication for in-
dividual electoral behavior (2.2). A third section then connects the two previous 
sections and lays out the general research hypotheses of this dissertation (2.3). 
  
2.1 Legitimacy and democracy in the European Union 
In this section, I discuss theoretical and empirical contributions in the research 
field of legitimacy and democracy in the EU, which entails an overview of differ-
ent concepts and sources of political legitimacy as well as their application to the 
European political system. At this stage, I also introduce the two central concepts 
of citizen-based Euroscepticism and political representation, which are of vital 
importance for evaluating the legitimacy of EU governance. Lastly, I discuss the 
EU’s alleged democratic deficit as well as the role of the European Parliament 
and EP elections in legitimizing the political system of the EU.  
 
2.1.1 Concepts and sources of political legitimacy 
The concept of political legitimacy – which refers to the acceptability, rightfulness 
and justification of political order, power and authority – has a long history in 
political philosophy (see, e.g., Locke 1952[1690], Rousseau 1988[1762], Weber 
1922). The main reason for its prominence is that legitimacy confers a right to 
exercise political power and the obligation to comply with it, which implies that 
“legitimate political systems are more likely to enjoy the voluntary compliance 
of those over whom they exercise power” (Lord 2015: 1). Until today, the study 
of political legitimacy is central for several sub-fields of political science, espe-
cially political theory (see, e.g., Rawls 1993, Buchanan 2002) and political 
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behavior (see, e.g., Weatherford 1992, Levi et al. 2009). In accordance with these 
two research areas, most contemporary authors distinguish between two types 
of political legitimacy or two ways of assessing the legitimacy of a political order: 
normative and descriptive legitimacy (see, e.g., Schmitt & Thomassen 1999, Lind-
gren & Persson 2010, Fuchs 2011, Weiler 2012).  
Normative legitimacy refers to a theoretical benchmark that a political authority 
can be evaluated against. Whether a political system or body is legitimate or not 
depends on the extent that it conforms to specific normative criteria and whether 
the coercive power it exercises can be theoretically justified. These normative cri-
teria can be set, for example, by theories of liberal, representative or deliberative 
democracy (Holzhacker 2007: 259). In contrast, descriptive legitimacy focuses on 
people’s legitimacy beliefs and asks whether the members of a political commu-
nity accept – at least passively – a given political order.2 In this sense, political 
authority can be regarded as legitimate, “when it is accepted as appropriate and 
worthy of being obeyed by those affected by its policies” (Lindgren & Persson 
2010: 451). Derived from the descriptive form of political legitimacy is the empir-
ical research program on political culture and political support, which highlights 
the importance of citizens’ attitudes and legitimacy beliefs for the stability of a 
political system (Lipset 1959, Almond & Verba 1963, Easton 1975).3  
Although the sharp distinction between the normative and descriptive concepts 
of political legitimacy is not without problems and critics (see, e.g., Habermas 
1979, Beetham 1991), it provides “two different vantage points in the study of 
political legitimacy, a macro perspective emphasizing formal system properties, 
and a micro view emphasizing citizens' attitudes and actions.” (Weatherford 
1992: 149).4 However, although both concepts of legitimacy allow to compare dif-
ferent political systems, it seems problematic that there are often no clear criteria 
                                                 
2 Descriptive legitimacy is at times also labelled “social” (Føllesdal 2004) or “sociological” (Lind-
gren & Persson 2010) legitimacy.  
3 Until today, this research area has produced a plethora of empirical studies relating to different 
modes of attitudes and various political objects (see, e.g., Kaase & Newton 1995, Norris 1999, 
Putnam 2000). 
4 Accordingly, Weatherford uses the terms “macro legitimacy” and “micro legitimacy” when re-
ferring to normative and descriptive concepts of political legitimacy. 
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which help to assess whether a political authority is regarded as sufficiently le-
gitimate. 
The sources of a political regime’s legitimacy are argued to lie in both its perfor-
mance as well as its processes (Scharpf 1999). On the one hand, a political order 
can be regarded as legitimate, because it provides policies from which the major-
ity of the people benefit. This form of legitimacy, which is derived by positive 
outcomes of political decisions and the efficiency of the policies adopted, is usu-
ally labeled output legitimacy. On the other hand, people can accept political au-
thority, because they appreciate the decision-making processes of the political 
system. In democracies, citizens usually demand the chance to influence policy-
making, which implies the need for equal participation opportunities, fair politi-
cal competition, transparency of decision-making processes and accountability 
of the decision-makers. Such an input legitimacy, therefore, rests on the participa-
tory quality of democratic processes (Lindgren & Persson 2010: 451).5 Although 
it is widely accepted that political legitimacy rests on a combination of both 
sources, descriptive legitimacy seems to be mainly created by beneficial outputs 
in most circumstances (Rothstein 2009). 
 
2.1.2 The legitimacy of European governance 
The European Union is a political regime in particular need of legitimacy, as it 
possesses extensive policy-making competencies but does not itself have any co-
ercive means of enforcing its policies. Being designed as a supranational, multi-
level system, it rests on the voluntary compliance of sovereign nation states as 
well as their respective citizens. However, research on the democratic legitimacy 
of European governance has only gained traction with the formal establishment 
of the EU in the 1990s. The emerging literature on the EU’s legitimacy also reveals 
                                                 
5 In addition, Schmidt (2013) introduces the concept of throughput legitimacy, which focuses on 
“the ‘black box’ of governance between input and output”, namely “governance processes with 
the people, analyzed in terms of their efficacy, accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and 
openness to interest consultation.” (Schmidt 2013: 2). 
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the aforementioned divide between normative and descriptive concepts of polit-
ical legitimacy. 
Regarding the descriptive concept of political legitimacy, the conventional wis-
dom is that the European integration project has for long enjoyed a “permissive 
consensus” (Inglehart 1970, Lindberg & Scheingold 1970) by its citizens. The no-
tion implies that the European publics were passively supportive or largely in-
different to the slow development of a political system on the European level, 
which was pursued mostly by political elites. However, with the signing and rat-
ification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992/93, the nature of European integration 
changed dramatically, as it transformed the predominantly economic and inter-
governmental European Communities into a genuine political union with a more 
supranational character (Fuchs 2011, Van Elsas & Van Der Brug 2015). Citizens 
in many member states reacted to these fundamental changes6 with reservation, 
with the results that public opinion towards the EU became increasingly critical 
in the years to follow – a development coined as the “post-Maastricht blues” 
(Eichenberg & Dalton 2007). The new “constraining dissensus” (Hooghe & Marks 
2009), which replaced the former permissive consensus, finally manifested in the 
political arena, when the French and the Dutch citizens voted against ratifying 
the Constitution Treaty in 2005. 
Around the same time, Euroscepticism became popular in the academic literature 
on party politics (Taggart 1998, Kopecký & Mudde 2002, Szczerbiak & Taggart 
2008) and public opinion (Hooghe & Marks 2007, Weßels 2007, Leconte 2010). 
The term explicitly emphasizes critical and opposing preferences towards the EU 
and the European integration process, which can be held by various political ac-
tors. In attitudinal research, Euroscepticism is commonly defined as “a subset of 
negative attitudes towards the European Union (EU) and/or European integra-
tion” (Serricchio et al. 2013), which hints to the multidimensional nature of these 
orientations (Boomgaarden et al. 2011). Authors who investigate – both positive 
and negative – attitudes towards European integration often refer to the concept 
                                                 
6 In Denmark, the Maastricht Treaty was initially rejected by the citizens in a referendum, but it 
was finally accepted in an adapted form.  
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of political support developed by Easton (1975) and apply it to the political sys-
tem of the European Union (see, e.g., Niedermayer & Westle 1995, Weßels 2007, 
Boomgaarden et al. 2011).7 The concept is particularly useful to distinguish be-
tween different attitudinal objects – e.g., the regime as a whole, the regime insti-
tutions and the political community – and between different modes of support. 
Regarding these support modes, authors often separate utilitarian/specific/out-
put-orientated orientations from affective/diffuse/input-orientated attitudes 
(Boomgaarden et al. 2011: 245), implying that the latter mode of support is par-
ticularly relevant for the EU’s democratic legitimacy (Easton 1975).8  
Yet, although citizens’ support for different political objects on the European 
level – such as the general principle of European integration and the EU mem-
bership of their country, the trust in the EU institutions and the self-identification 
as Europeans – are all regarded as essential for the stability and legitimacy of the 
Union, it is still debated whether the surge in popular Euroscepticism has signif-
icantly threatened the EU’s legitimacy. In fact, empirical studies suggest that the 
Euro crisis led to significant drops in utilitarian-specific EU support in countries 
most affected by severe economic hardship (Braun & Tausendpfund 2014, 
Schäfer & Gross 2020). However, it seems that this is not the case for more affec-
tive-diffuse modes of support, implying that even “in times of crisis, the Euro-
pean Union can draw on mass public support as a source of resilience” 
(Ringlerova 2015: 558). Nevertheless, with the negative outcome of the Brexit ref-
erendum in 2016, the drastic political consequences of citizen-based Euroscepti-
cism have become as visible as never before and, thus, seem to be of continuing 
concern (Vasilopoulou 2016).9  
                                                 
7 From the research program on public opinion towards European integration, a rich literature 
emerged on the causes and consequences of EU support and Euroscepticism (see for an overview, 
e.g., Hobolt & De Vries 2016a, Ejrnæs & Jensen 2019). 
8 According to Easton (1965, 1975), diffuse support for a political system is a generalized attach-
ment that represents “a reservoir of […] good will” (Easton 1975: 444), which is unaffected by 
short-term discontent due to negative political outputs.  
9 Interestingly, Europe-wide attitudes towards the EU have become more positive again since the 
Brexit referendum, which indicates the relevance of benchmarks and potential “alternative 
states” when people evaluate the EU (De Vries 2018). 
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From the normative perspective, the EU’s legitimacy has been intensively dis-
cussed from different perspective since the beginning of the 1990s (see, e.g., 
Beetham & Lord 1998, Bellamy & Castiglione 2003, Lord & Magnette 2004, 
Kohler-Koch & Rittberger 2007), which has led some scholars to assess “a theo-
retical labyrinth with no exit” (Wimmel 2008: 49). In most instances, the common 
theme is the dual character of the EU’s political legitimacy, since the Union, much 
like a federal state, derives its legitimacy from both its constituent states as well 
as its citizens (De Vries & Hobolt 2016: 103). Rather recently, Kröger and Friedrich 
(2013) diagnose a “representative turn in EU studies” (see also Norris 1997a, 
Schmitt & Thomassen 1999, Lord & Pollack 2010). The authors highlight the im-
portance of political representation for the political system of the EU, as “it is ac-
cepted today that political representation is a sine qua non for the legitimacy of 
any democratic political system” (Kröger & Friedrich 2013: 156).10 For Kröger 
(2015), representation is “the institutional translation of the principle of political 
equality” (Kröger 2015: 469), which refers to both the equality of sovereign nation 
states and the equality of self-determined citizens. Political representation and, 
thus, political legitimacy in the EU have to be realized through regular, free and 
fair elections as well as a representative government, which aggregates societal 
interests and preferences, via “two channels of representation” (Mair 2005, 2007): 
an indirect intergovernmental channel through national elections and national 
government in the Council as well as a direct supranational channel through elec-
tions to the European Parliament. 
The new focus on political representation in EU studies has much to do with the 
way that the EU understands its own democratic legitimacy. With the ratification 
of the Lisbon Treaty and the entering into force of the consolidated version of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 2009, the EU officially adopted democratic 
                                                 
10 According to the most basic definition in representation theory (Pitkin 1967), political represen-
tation is the activity of making citizens’ voices and preferences “present” in policy-making pro-
cesses. It is, however, apparent that representation is a multi-faceted concept (see, e.g., Mans-
bridge 2003, 2011) that is not discussed in detail here. In the empirical study of representation, for 
example, two distinct strands of literature have emerged that focus either on “(issue) congruence” 
between elites and voters or on “(policy) responsiveness” by elites to the wishes of the people 
(Powell 2004, Wlezien 2017, Beyer & Hänni 2018). 
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principles declaring it is founded on representative democracy (Art. 10.1 TEU) 
and on the principle of equality (Art. 9 TEU). Hence, political equality and repre-
sentative democracy can serve as legitimate “meta-standards” (Lord & Pollak 
2010: 126) to evaluate the EU’s political legitimacy. Moreover, the treaty makes 
explicit reference to the dual electoral representation in the EU’s political system 
(Art. 10.2 TEU).11 However, it can be argued that the supranational “chain of del-
egation and accountability” (Strøm 2000) is incomplete because of the limited 
powers that the Parliament has to vote in and control a government. This situa-
tion creates a “crisis of political representation” (Hayward 1995), which is detri-
mental to the legitimacy of EU governance. Rittberger (2012), therefore, diagno-
ses a “legitimacy gap” in the EU, as “the principle of representative democracy 
is undermined” (Rittberger 2012: 29).  
A critical role for the process of political representation is played by political par-
ties, as they embody the central linkage between citizens and their government 
(Sartori 2005). This essential function of political parties for representative de-
mocracies is at the heart of the “responsible party model” laid out by 
Schattschneider (1942) who famously remarked that “modern democracy is un-
thinkable save in terms of the parties” (Schattschneider 1942: 1). In a similar fash-
ion, Sartori (1968) underlines that “citizens in modern democracies are repre-
sented through and by parties” (Sartori 1968: 417). From this perspective, parties’ 
capacity to represent citizens on the European level is therefore of central im-
portance for the legitimacy of the EU’s political system. Moreover, political rep-
resentation also plays a vital role for rational choice theories of democracy 
(Downs 1957), which rest on the assumption that effective representation re-
quires political parties that compete on the same ideological dimensions as their 
electorate. 
Consequently, the Lisbon Treaty introduced an explicit reference to the repre-
sentative role of parties by stating that “political parties at European level 
                                                 
11 This dual representation hints at the coexistence of two forms of political equality on the Euro-
pean level, where equality refers both to citizens (principle of individual self-determination) and 
to nation states (principle of national sovereignty) with no particular hierarchy (Kröger 2015). 
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contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of 
citizens of the Union” (Art. 10.4 TEU). However, there is no real party structure 
on the European level and even the national parties do not fulfill a governmental 
function in European politics. The result is a representation gap between political 
elites on the European level and the electorates, especially when it comes to the 
issue of European integration (Costello et al. 2012). Nevertheless, Mair and 
Thomassen (2010) claim that “because they don’t govern, parties have a much 
greater capacity to act as representatives” (Mair & Thomassen 2010: 27), thus im-
plying that political parties on the European level actually fulfill the function of 
controlling and scrutinizing the executive. This can actually be observed when 
concentrating on the left-right dimension of political competition (Costello et al. 
2012). Yet, it is still highly debated whether political parties serve as effective in-
struments of political representation in European politics (see, e.g., Sorace 2018) 
and to what extent the quality of representation has been affected by the recent 
European crises (see, e.g., Conti et al. 2018, Traber et al. 2018). 
The gap between normative and descriptive conceptions of legitimacy is bridged 
by streams of empirical literature that analyzes the extent to which (perceived) 
political representation affects political support and legitimacy beliefs of individ-
uals. As such, it has been consistently shown that different measures of represen-
tation, such as ideological and policy-based congruence or perceived responsive-
ness of political elites, increase satisfaction with democracy and political support 
(Ezrow & Xezonakis 2011, Reher 2015, Stecker & Tausendpfund 2016, Esaiasson 
et al. 2017, Ferland 2017, Mayne & Hakhverdian 2017). These findings imply that 
normative and descriptive political legitimacy are indeed closely related. How-
ever, there is much less scholarly knowledge about the attitudinal and behavioral 
consequences of (lacking) political representation in the case of the EU’s political 
system. 
 
2.1.3 The EU’s democratic deficit and the European Parliament 
The ambivalent and inconclusive nature of electoral representation in European 
politics is also a core feature of the debate on the EU’s alleged democratic deficit, 
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particularly from the perspective of scholars who mainly identify institutional 
deficits (Føllesdal & Hix 2006).12 The “standard version” (Weiler et al. 1995) of the 
democratic deficit thesis rests on the assumption that European integration led 
to “an increase in executive power and a decrease in parliamentary control” 
(Føllesdal & Hix 2006: 534) across Europe, in particular because of the dominant 
role of the Council in EU policy-making. National legislatives subsequently lost 
the ability to exercise control over governments in certain policy areas. Since this 
loss in parliamentary oversight had not been adequately substituted by sufficient 
democratic control at the European level, the democratic quality of the EU’s po-
litical decisions decreased with the step-wise transfer of policy-making power 
from the national to the supranational level. More specifically, the EP’s lacking 
capacities to nominate and control the EU executive, to initiate legislation and to 
act as an equal co-legislator have been diagnosed as most relevant contributors 
to the EU’s institutional democratic deficit (Føllesdal & Hix 2006). 
In response, repeated efforts of democratizing the EU have mostly focused on the 
supranational solution, namely on the role of the European Parliament “as the 
‘democratic pillar’ of the Union” (Blondel et al. 1998: 11). Many hopes had al-
ready been put into the first direct elections of the EP in 1979, when Belgium 
prime minister Leo Tindemans expected that “direct elections to the Parliament 
[…] will reinforce the democratic legitimacy of the whole European institutional 
apparatus” (Tindemans Report 1975: 29). The process of strengthening democracy 
and accountability in the EU also led to an increase in the EP’s legislative powers 
(Rittberger 2005, Hix et al. 2007). But it was not before the introduction of the 
“Co-decision Procedure” by the Maastricht Treaty and its institutionalization as 
“Ordinary Legislative Procedure” (OLP) in the Lisbon Treaty that the European 
Parliament obtained the status of a fully equal co-legislator in most policy areas. 
The eventual introduction of the OLP was thus seen as a further step for “the 
                                                 
12 Other camps in this debate are formed, for example, by scholars who do not see a democratic 
deficit in the EU (Majone 1996, Moravcsik 2002) or by those who rather identify a structural (“no 
demos” thesis) than an institutional deficit (Höreth 1999, Kielmansegg 2003).  
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gradual institutionalization of representative democracy as a constitutional prin-
ciple of the EU” (Rittberger 2012: 18).  
Apart from establishing a direct legitimation of the EP via elections and granting 
the Parliament more powers in EU policy making, treaty reforms also concen-
trated on establishing a better link between voters and EU institutions by reform-
ing European Parliament elections and the formation of the European Commis-
sion. Although it has proven to be difficult to establish uniform electoral proce-
dures13, the Amsterdam Treaty provided the opportunity to introduce “common 
principles” for EP elections in all member states. In 2002, the Council finally 
adopted the Anastassopoulos Report (1998), which put forward a number of com-
mon electoral principles, such as the proportional representation (PR) voting sys-
tem with the allowance of single transferable and preferential voting. However, 
there are still “significant variations in the way in which these elections are con-
ducted in member states” (Franklin & Hobolt 2015: 401).14  
Beside the electoral reforms, successive treaty changes gave the EP the power to 
approve the European Commission (Maastricht), which de facto resulted in the 
possibility to veto individual commissioners, and to elect the Commission presi-
dent with absolute majority (Amsterdam). These control powers were added to 
the right to dismiss the entire Commission by a two-thirds majority. Moreover, 
the terms of office for both institutions – Parliament and Commission – were har-
monized by the Maastricht Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty then granted the most far-
reaching appointment powers to the EP to date by demanding that the European 
Council has to “take into account” the elections to the European Parliament when 
nominating a candidate for President of the European Commission (Art. 17.7 
TEU). Following this reform, the EP successfully called the European level polit-
ical parties to present top candidates for the Commission presidency – so-called 
                                                 
13 See for attempts of introducing uniform electoral procedures, for example, the Seitlinger Report 
(1982) or the Bocklet Report (1985). 
14 These differences in electoral procedures concern, for example, the exact day of the election, the 
size of the constituencies, the existence of compulsory voting and electoral thresholds as well as 
the minimum age for voting and for standing as a candidate. These differences persist due to the 
specific traditions in the electoral systems and rules of the different nation states. 
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“Spitzenkandidaten” – during the 2014 EP election campaign (Duff Report 2008). 
Directly after the election, national governments nominated the candidate of the 
biggest political group, Jean-Claude Juncker (EPP), in order to strengthen the 
democratic legitimacy of the European Union (Hobolt 2014). As a result, the ex-
ecutive branch of the Union has been for the first time selected in a “quasi-par-
liamentary” manner (Franklin & Hobolt 2015: 400).  
Although the Spitzenkandidaten procedure has experienced a significant setback 
in the 2019 EP elections, it can be concluded that the steady development of Eu-
ropean elections points to the important function that these elections have for the 
political legitimacy of the Union. A central reason for this assumption is that elec-
tions are not only about selecting representatives and holding them accountable 
for past performances. Elections are also crucial for the legitimization of authority 
– both to the ones exercising political power and to the political system more 
generally (Rose & Mossawir 1967: 178).  
It is therefore not surprising that one additional and important feature of the 
“standard version” of the EU’s alleged democratic deficit is the inability of EP 
elections to provide democratic legitimacy (Weiler et al. 1995, Føllesdal & Hix 
2006). Apart from certain problematic features of the electoral system15, authors 
usually provide two main justifications for this assessment. First, voter turnout 
is usually much lower than turnout in national elections and has even decreased 
over time, which appears almost “paradoxically” given the gradual increase in 
powers of the European Parliament (Weiler et al. 1995: 8). Lutz and Marsh (2007) 
argue that “the legitimacy of democracy in general and the outcomes of elections 
in particular are undermined when many citizens do not vote” (Lutz & Marsh 
2007: 539). Although this argument is not uncontested in the literature, Norris 
(1997a) highlights that “voting participation is commonly regarded as one major 
indicator of the health of a democracy, reflecting trust and confidence in the po-
litical system” (Norris 1997a: 281).  
                                                 
15 Since the number of MEPs per country is generally rather low (compared to national elections) 
and since there are no local constituencies, there is hardly any direct contact and accountability 
between individual MEPs and citizens. 
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Second, the EP elections are commonly denied their “European” character by Eu-
ropean integration scholars. Føllesdal and Hix (2006) state that they are neither 
“about the personalities and parties at the European level [n]or the direction of 
the EU policy agenda” (Føllesdal & Hix 2006: 536). Elections are fought over do-
mestic issues by national parties that communicate and compete in nationally 
fragmented discourse arenas. In addition, people have much less interest and 
knowledge in European politics than in national politics (Pannico 2017: 3, see also 
Hobolt 2007). The combination of the aforementioned factors leads Weiler et al. 
(1995) to conclude that “no one who votes in the European elections has a strong 
sense at all of affecting critical policy choices at the European level, and certainly 
not of confirming or rejecting European governance” (Weiler et al. 1995: 8).  
Taken together, it is highly questionable whether the European Parliament and 
its regular elections provide the EU with the democratic legitimacy that it needs 
and that it claims to have. Thomassen and Schmitt (1999) remark that democratic 
representation in the EU is not only “failing because of the lack of a system of 
responsible government, but also because elections for the European Parliament 
fail for a number of reasons to link the views of the European people on political 
matters to the agenda of the European Parliament” (Thomassen & Schmitt 1999: 
4). Franklin and Hobolt (2015) add to this assessment that “what the European 
Parliament lacks most today is not more legislative power – that has been ex-
panded by successive treaty reforms – but a mandate to use that power in any 
particular manner. It lacks that mandate because of the way in which European 
elections have been conducted, not least due to the lack of any real contestation 
over alternative policy agendas” (Franklin & Hobolt 2015: 414).  
As an important specification, Blondel et al. (1998) assume that the main question 
regarding the legitimizing function of European elections is “whether or to what 
extent they are conducted independently from other elections” (Blondel et al. 
1998: 14). In other words, they ask whether EP elections have a ‘sui generis’ char-
acter or whether they are just subordinate to national elections. The answer to 
this question concerns the debate between proponents of the “second-order elec-
tions” research paradigm and authors of the “Europe matters” literature, which 
will both be discussed in the following section.  
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2.2 EP election theories and citizens’ electoral behavior  
In this section, I lay out two theoretical approaches of understanding the nature 
of contemporary EP elections – the “second-order election” framework and the 
“Europe matters” approach – as well as their implications for the electoral behav-
ior of EU citizens and the legitimizing function of European elections. 
 
2.2.1 The “second-order elections” framework 
“European elections are additional national second-order elections. They are determined 
more by the domestic political cleavages than by alternatives originating in the EC.”  
(Reif & Schmitt 1980: 3) 
 
For the last forty years, the dominant paradigm in European election research has 
been the “second-order (national) elections” approach developed by Reif and 
Schmitt (1980) in their seminal work on the first direct EP elections. Although it 
is mostly tested by using aggregate-level data, it has become the “standard theory 
of European Parliament elections” (Hix & Marsh 2007: 495), as it consistently 
helps to explain patterns in the election results across EU member states (Reif 
1984, Schmitt 2005, Hix & Marsh 2007, 2011, Schmitt & Teperoglou 2015, Schmitt 
& Toygür 2016) The term second-order election (SOE) describes the relationship 
that characterize these less relevant and less salient elections compared to the 
more important elections in a (national) political system, in which the govern-
ment is determined: so-called first-order elections (FOE). Most political power is 
located in FOE arenas and then delegated from citizens to representatives in a 
“prevalent process of democratic political legitimization” (Reif 1997: 116). SOE 
are only secondary in this regard, which is why the term can be applied to all 
other elections including European but also regional electoral contests.  
A number of electoral patterns characterize SOE. Most strikingly, voter turnout 
is lower than in FOE and one can observe electoral losses for large and governing 
parties to the benefit of small and opposition parties (Van Der Eijk & Franklin 
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1996, Ferrara & Weishaupt 2004, Hix & Marsh 2007).16 In the case of EP elections, 
it has been observed, first, that the turnout difference between European and na-
tional elections – which Rose (2004) coined the “Euro gap” – lies on average be-
tween 15 and 25 points. Second, the main beneficiaries of electoral gains in EP 
elections have so far been Green and anti-EU parties on both sides of the ideolog-
ical spectrum, whereas centrist parties – such as Socialists, Conservatives and 
Liberals – have been the losers of the second-order mechanisms (Franklin & Ho-
bolt 2015: 403). Third, the electoral pattern is affected by the timing of the SOE 
with regards to the electoral cycle of the respective FOE. Those cyclical effects are 
explained with the downward trend in popular popularity of governments 
around the national midterm (Reif & Schmitt 1980). This “cycle of popularity” 
(Marsh 1998), thus, is a function of the national electoral cycle, where losses of 
big and governing parties are “highest at midterm and fade toward the beginning 
and the end of a legislative period” (Weber 2011: 909). Fourth, there are further 
contextual factors that determine electoral results in European Parliament elec-
tions, especially features of the electoral system, such as the question whether or 
not voting is compulsory, and whether an EP election is conducted for the first 
time in a country (Franklin & Hobolt 2015). Lastly, the second-order model ex-
plains the electoral patterns in the older Western European member states signif-
icantly better than in the former communist countries that joined the EU after 
2004 (Schmitt 2005).  
Regarding the underlying individual-level mechanisms for these patterns, Reif 
(1984: 246-247) remarks that citizens are less interested in SOE, because “there is 
less at stake” than in FOE. This notion implies that the lower turnout is mainly 
caused by personal indifference or a lack of political awareness, especially when 
it comes to European affairs. Apart from that, individual electoral participation 
is affected by the same factors that determine turnout in FOE. Moreover, the per-
ception that SOE are of lower importance invites people to vote less tactically or 
                                                 
16 There are also institutional reasons why smaller parties benefit, at least in some electoral con-
texts. The reason is that different electoral rules, for example the fact that European elections are 
more proportional, can provide citizens with the chance to vote (sincerely) for parties they would 
not vote for (strategically) in national elections. 
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strategically (“voting with the head”) and provides them with the opportunity to 
vote sincerely for their most preferred party (“voting with the heart”) or to pun-
ish (national) government parties for bad performances (“voting with the boot”) 
as a sign of protest (Oppenhuis et al. 1996).17 Taken together, the SOE approach 
postulates that the individual vote choices in European elections mainly depend 
on first-order issues and considerations, which indicates that national issues 
dominate European issues in EP election campaigns.  
This assumption has important implications for the legitimizing function of Eu-
ropean elections. Blondel et al. (1998) remark that if there are no arena-specific 
European considerations at play in European Parliament elections, then “Euro-
pean elections would have no effect whatsoever on the legitimacy of the Union” 
(Blondel et al. 1998: 14). Even more specifically, Føllesdal and Hix (2006) note that 
the absence of a “European” element in EP elections means that “EU citizens’ 
preferences on issues on the EU policy agenda at best have only an indirect in-
fluence on EU policy outcomes” (Føllesdal & Hix 2006: 536). It is for this reason 
that Norris (1997b) notes: “so long as elections to the EP remain second-order 
contests, the legitimacy and authority of this body remains under question, and 
the ghost of the ‘democratic deficit’ will continue to haunt the European Union.” 
(Norris 1997b: 114). Evidently, the implication is that EP elections can only legit-
imate policy-making on the EU level and the political authority of the EU more 
generally, when EU issues play a significant role for citizens in the election.  
 
2.2.2 The “Europe matters” approach 
“In other words, the combined effect of the overall strengthening of EP powers – both in 
absolute and relative terms – and the visibility of EU measures in the management of the 
economic and financial crisis leads us to believe that European Parliamentary elections 
may start to matter, becoming an electoral battlefield where something is at stake.” 
(Trechsel et al. 2017: 4) 
                                                 
17 The argument that voters punish incumbent parties for bad performances picks up on the eco-
nomic voting literature (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2000, Kousser 2004). 
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Although the second-order approach remains powerful in explaining general 
electoral patterns in European elections up to this date (De Sio et al. 2019), recent 
literature highlights that European integration has become an increasingly im-
portant issue in EP elections (De Vries et al. 2011, Hobolt 2015, Braun et al. 2016). 
While aggregate-level studies already indicate that political parties with a clear 
position on European integration, such as anti-EU parties, gain votes in EP elec-
tions (Hix & Marsh 2007), individual-level research adds that arena-specific Eu-
ropean considerations matter for citizens in their decision whether or not to vote 
in European elections and whom to vote for (Hobolt & Spoon 2012, Hernández 
& Kriesi 2016). Empirical studies that focus on these “European” explanatory fac-
tors for citizens’ electoral behavior are often subsumed under the label “Europe 
matters” (Franklin & Hobolt 2015) or “Europe salience” (Viola 2016). Although 
the Europe matters literature does not repudiate the SOE model, it discusses the 
extent to which EP elections have become “less ‘second-order national elections’ 
and more truly European contests” (Hobolt 2015: 8).  
Considering electoral (non-)participation in EP elections, various “European” 
factors seem to play a role for the individual turnout decision (Mattila 2003, Flick-
inger & Studlar 2007, Steinbrecher & Rattinger 2012). In particular, an individ-
ual’s attitudes towards European integration and the EU (Blondel et al. 1998, Ho-
bolt & Spoon 2012, Hernández & Kriesi 2016, Kentmen-Cin 2017), often measured 
by the support for the EU membership of one’s country (Rosema 2007, 
Steinbrecher 2014), contribute to the likelihood of taking part in EP elections. This 
finding is supported by aggregate-level analyses which show that EP election 
turnout is higher in countries with a pro-European public opinion (Flickinger & 
Studlar 2007, Evans & Ivaldi 2012, Stockemer 2012, Steinbrecher 2014, Fiorino et 
al. 2019) and countries which are net recipients of EU subsidies (Mattila 2003, 
Evans & Ivaldi 2012). Furthermore, individual interest in European politics 
(Clark 2014) and knowledge about EU politics (Blondel et al. 1998) as well as 
about the Spitzenkandidaten (Schmitt et al. 2015) mobilize people to turnout. 
If people vote with European considerations in mind, we are faced with a phe-
nomenon that scholars call “EU issue voting” (De Vries 2007, De Vries & Hobolt 
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2016).18 While the classic SOE approach assumes that voting is wholly deter-
mined by national level factors, the Europe matters literature shows that citizens 
make their voting decision in EP elections dependent on their attitudes towards 
European integration and the EU (Clark & Rohrschneider 2009, De Vries et al. 
2011, Van Spanje & De Vreese 2011, Van Elsas et al. 2019). When citizens rely on 
EU attitudes in European elections, they might be incentivized to switch their 
vote compared to previous national elections where other issues are usually more 
important. Empirical studies illustrate, for example, that holding Eurosceptic at-
titudes increases the likelihood to defect from more pro-European government 
parties (Hobolt et al. 2009). In addition, decreasing policy congruence on the EU 
integration dimension to parties previously voted for makes it more likely that 
voters switch parties in EP elections (Hobolt & Spoon 2012).  
However, the degree to which EU issue voting can be observed in European elec-
tions is context-dependent. Cross-national studies demonstrate that attitudes to-
wards the EU matter for EP election behavior in contexts where the media devote 
more attention to EU issues (De Vries & Hobolt 2016) and where the party system 
is more polarized regarding the issue of European integration (Van Spanje & De 
Vreese 2011, Hobolt & Spoon 2012). The systemic issue salience and the issue 
polarization of political actors are sub-dimensions of the “issue politicization” 
concept (De Wilde 2011, Hutter et al. 2016, Kriesi 2016, Hutter & Kriesi 2019), 
commonly defined as the “expansion of the scope of conflict’ within the political 
system” (Hutter & Grande 2014: 1003). 
For a long time, European integration had not been a contested issue in the EU 
member states, mainly because mainstream parties actively depoliticized the is-
sue in various ways, thereby turning it into a “sleeping giant” (Van Der Eijk & 
Franklin 2004, De Vries 2007, De Wilde & Zürn 2012). Existing and emerging Eu-
rosceptic parties exploited this situation by acting as “issue entrepreneurs” 
                                                 
18 EU issue voting is also studied on the national level (see, e.g., Tillman 2004, De Vries & Hobolt 
2016, Schoen 2019). Although this research is of vital importance considering the dual electoral 
connection in between the EU and its citizens, I solely focus here on EU issue voting in European 
Parliament elections. 
 
  21 
 
(Hobolt & De Vries 2015),19 which means that they politicized the issue of Euro-
pean integration in order to gain votes of Eurosceptic citizens in national and 
European elections (Hooghe & Marks 2009, 2018). The economic and sovereign 
debt crisis led to a further politicization of European integration, as both the sa-
lience and the polarization of this issue increased after the year 2010 (Hutter & 
Kriesi 2019). However, degree of EU issue politicization varies considerably over 
the EU member states yielding a “regionally differentiated politicization” (Hutter 
& Kriesi 2019: 19) with a particularly strong politicization boost in Southern Eu-
rope whereas EU issues are still hardly politicized in Central and Eastern Europe. 
There are several reasons why the level of EU issue politicization influences the 
degree to which attitudes towards the EU matter for people’s electoral behavior. 
Since citizens are usually not well informed about European politics prior to the 
EP election, electoral campaigns can exert strong effects on individuals who re-
ceive information on EU issues and the programmatic positions of political par-
ties. Beach et al. (2018) illustrate for Danish voters that their vote intention be-
came increasingly dependent on their view on European integration over the 
course of 2014 EP election campaign. This is supported by an experimental study 
of Hobolt and Wittrock (2011) who show that “when participants were given 
more information about party placements on the EU dimension, they were more 
likely to vote on the basis of their EU attitudes” (Hobolt & Wittrock 2011: 39). 
This conditioning effect is enhanced when parties occupy more dispersed posi-
tions on EU issues, as “voters only take EU-specific considerations into account 
when political parties provide them with clear choices” (Hobolt & Spoon 2012: 
719). Based on these findings, it can be concluded that in electoral contexts that 
provide citizens with more information on EU issues and party positions regard-
ing European integration – due to a higher issue salience and a stronger issue 
polarization – EU attitudes become more relevant for people’s electoral behavior.  
                                                 
19 Hobolt and De Vries (2015) define a party as issue entrepreneur “when it actively promotes a 
previously ignored issue and adopts a position that is different from that of the mean position in 
the party system.” (Hobolt & De Vries 2015: 1168). 
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Taken together, the “Europe matters” literature offers important insights in the 
study of EP elections and their implications for the legitimizing function of Eu-
ropean elections. However, respective authors rarely approach individual elec-
toral behavior as directly targeting the legitimacy and stability of the EU. Yet, it 
seems worth mentioning that the electoral behavior of citizens can be regarded a 
direct expression of individual political support or the lack thereof. Both the mere 
participation in an EP election and the vote for a pro-European political party 
represent forms of “system-supporting behavior” (Bauer 2020). On the contrary, 
staying at home during European elections or voting for anti-EU parties can be 
seen as “system-critical behavior”, implying that they are “micro-level manifes-
tation[s] of low levels of EU regime support” (Bauer 2020: 154, see also Fuchs 
2002: 39). In his empirical study, Bauer (2020) shows that relationship between 
EU support and EP election behavior has become stronger after the Euro crisis 
“rendering the electoral choice a true supporting or sceptical action as a systemic 
consequence of individual generalized EU regime support” (Bauer 2020: 281). 
Besides this expressive view on electoral behavior, it might also be assumed that 
Eurosceptic citizens are aware that both electoral decisions – the participation 
decision and the vote choice – bear consequences for the legitimacy and stability 
of the Union. In this line of argument, electoral behavior is based on rational and 
instrumental grounds. Eurosceptic citizens, for example, face two viable options 
to delegitimize the EU in EP elections – non-voting or voting for anti-EU parties 
– that both constitute threats to the future of the European integration process, if 
done on a mass level. This is, on the one hand, because low voter turnout is often 
seen as indicating problems with the “health” of a political system (Norris 1997b: 
281). Non-voting in EP elections can thus be regarded as a delegitimizing act and, 
if done intentionally, as “one way of expressing opposition to the European po-
litical system and the integration process” (Steinbrecher & Rattinger 2012: 171). 
On the other hand, voting for Eurosceptic parties in EP elections might contribute 
to a growing instability of EU institutions. As an example, high seat shares for 
anti-EU parties in the European Parliament might seriously affect the way in 
which this institution functions (Brack 2018: 3). As most citizens should be 
vaguely aware of these political consequences, it seems not totally unthinkable 
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that strong, negative attitudes towards European integration result in – one of 
the two forms of – system-critical behavior, when “Europe matters” to them. 
 
2.3 Basic research interest and hypotheses  
As it has been argued, this thesis departs from the basic assumptions that elec-
tions to the European Parliament have an important legitimizing function for the 
political system of the EU. However, their capability to legitimize political au-
thority on the European level depends on the degree to which citizens regard 
those elections as independent from other elections, especially from those that 
allocate power at the national level. While the SOE theory implies that the legiti-
mizing character of European elections is rather limited, the “Europe matters” 
approach postulates that citizens actually do consider “European” factors during 
EP elections. This is momentous, because European elections should be less sec-
ond-order to citizens, so that they can fulfill their legitimizing function. The gen-
eral interest of this dissertation is, thus, to further our understanding of how Eu-
rope matters for the individual electoral behavior of EU citizens.  
As individual electoral behavior I understand both the decision of whether or not to 
vote in an EP election and the choice of whom to vote for. With this conceptual-
ization, I rely on previous research in the areas of electoral (non-)participation 
and voting behavior. Both research fields have identified a variety of determi-
nants that explain why people participate in elections and why they vote for a 
particular party. By controlling for the traditional determinants of individual 
electoral behavior and by accounting for the individual-level assumptions of the 
SOE framework, I aim to assess the additional explanatory power of “European” 
explanatory factors during EP elections. 
Evidently, the notion of European factors is rather broad and in need of further 
specification. As I am particularly interested in the legitimacy of EU governance, 
I build on the literature of political support and political representation that I 
discussed above. Hence, I focus on citizens’ attitudes towards the EU as well as 
voter-party congruence, especially regarding the issue of European integration, 
as most relevant individual level dispositions. Moreover, I acknowledge the 
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context-dependency of both EP elections and the relationship between individual 
orientations and electoral choices in European elections. Therefore, I am also in-
terested in the extent to which European issues are politicized in the EU member 
states, especially following the European economic and sovereign debt crisis.  
Figure 1: General research interest and research hypotheses of the dissertation 
 
 
Figure 1 visualizes the research interest of this dissertation highlighting the dif-
ferent analytical levels of the explanatory factors for the individual-level electoral 
behavior of EU citizens. Following the “Europe matters” approach, the arrows 
represent hypotheses about theoretical mechanisms that were already mentioned 
in the theoretical background, but are extensively discussed and analytically 
tested in the empirical studies. These hypotheses concern, first, the direct effects 
of citizen preferences towards European integration on their EP election behav-
ior. Second, they address the conditioning effects of EU issue politicization and 
political representation on the electoral impacts of individual orientations to-
wards European integration. If “Europe matters” for citizens in European elec-
tions, the studies should find significant effects of “European” factors both on the 
participation decision and the vote choice of EU citizens.  
Furthermore, several assumptions about the impact of these electoral effects on 
the legitimizing capacity of EP elections are underlying these research hypothe-
ses, as already addressed in the theoretical background (see also fig. 1). First, the 
greater the influence of individual attitudes towards the EU is for citizens’ 
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behavior in EP elections, the more can European elections fulfill their legitimizing 
function. Second, the greater the influence of voter-party congruence, especially 
regarding the issue of European integration, is for citizens’ behavior in EP elec-
tions and the more it enhances the electoral impact of EU attitudes, the more can 
European elections fulfill their legitimizing function. Third, the more the politi-
cization of European integration an EU member state enhances the electoral im-
pact of EU attitudes and voter-party congruence, the more can European elec-
tions fulfill their legitimizing function. These three assumptions as well as the 
research hypotheses sketched out above underly the more specific research ques-
tions and the empirical hypotheses that are derived and tested in the empirical 
studies that are discussed in the following section. 
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3 Empirical Studies  
In this section, I depart from the general research interest and discuss the more 
specific research questions and contributions of the three empirical studies on 
Attitudes towards European Integration and Behavior in European Parliament Elections. 
Therefore, I lay out the research gaps and empirical research questions of the 
studies (3.1), before summarizing the single articles (3.2) and discussing their 
contributions to the literature on European elections (3.3). 
 
3.1 Research gaps and empirical research questions 
The thesis addresses several research gaps that can be identified in the EP election 
literature. First, although previous research shows that preferences towards Eu-
ropean integration are increasingly important for the electoral behavior of EU 
citizens (Clark & Rohrschneider 2009, Hobolt & Spoon 2012, Hernández & Kriesi 
2016, Bauer 2020), it is much less clear which attitudes exactly determine the elec-
toral choices of voters in EP elections. Despite the observed multidimensionality 
of EU attitudes in general (Boomgaarden et al. 2011) and Euroscepticism in par-
ticular (Weßels 2007), empirical studies too often rely on single attitudinal indi-
cators and one-dimensional survey items when measuring EU support (see, e.g., 
Stockemer 2012, Steinbrecher 2014). This is particularly surprising, since the orig-
inal political support concept was already developed as a multidimensional con-
cept (Easton 1975). Therefore, this thesis aims at disentangling the electoral im-
pact of different theoretically derived dimensions of attitudes towards the EU.  
Second, despite the increasing prominence of Euroscepticism in the public dis-
course and as an own sub-field of European studies (Leconte 2015, Leruth et al. 
2017), there is astonishingly little empirical evidence on the behavioral conse-
quences of Eurosceptic attitudes (but see Werts et al. 2013, McDonnell & Werner 
2018, Schneider 2019). Even in the area of EP election research, the electoral im-
pacts of preferences towards European integration, such as the vote for Euroscep-
tic parties, are usually studied without a specific focus on negative EU attitudes 
(but see Van Spanje & De Vreese 2011, Treib 2014). Moreover, there are only few 
studies that analyze both forms of Eurosceptic electoral behavior – non-voting 
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and Eurosceptic voting – as dependent variables in a joint approach. Where it is 
done, scholars do not follow an integrated methodological approach, but rather 
study both phenomena in separate analyses (Hobolt et al. 2009, Hernández & 
Kriesi 2016, but see Hobolt & Spoon 2009). This thesis, therefore, puts a stronger 
focus on the consequences of Eurosceptic attitudes for electoral behavior and also 
explicitly models a Eurosceptic person’s electoral trade-off between abstaining 
and Eurosceptic voting.  
Third, although the great difference in turnout between national and European 
elections is widely noticed – and forms part of both the democratic deficit debate 
and the SOE framework – it is rarely studied on the individual level (Boom-
gaarden et al. 2016: 132). Although some advances have been made in under-
standing vote-switching behavior (Hobolt et al. 2009, Marsh 2009, Hobolt & 
Spoon 2012), there has been little scholarly attention to the group of “European-
only” abstainers (but see Blondel et al. 1997, 1998, Boomgaarden et al. 2016) who 
constitute the so-called “Euro gap” (Rose 2004) on the aggregate level. This is an 
important blind spot of EP election research, as the motivations of these people 
have important implications for the assumptions of the SOE and the “Europe 
matters” approaches. Moreover, analyzing individual electoral behavior on the 
aggregate level risks the occurrence of ecological fallacy (Clark & Rohrschneider 
2009: 649, Giebler & Wagner 2015: 132), which in fact concerns most empirical 
studies within the traditional SOE framework (see, e.g., Hix & Marsh 2007, 
Schmitt & Toygür 2016). In this thesis, I therefore analyze the motivations of EU-
only abstainers on the more appropriate, i.e. the individual, level.  
Fourth, preferences regarding European integration do not only entail positive 
or negative attitudes towards the EU, but also concern views on the further de-
velopment of the Union. Such a policy dimension ranging from expansive further 
political integration to completely reversing the unification process, seems elec-
torally important, as political parties compete on this issue both in national and 
European elections (Marks et al. 2006, Kriesi 2007, Hobolt & De Vries 2015, Rohr-
schneider & Whitefield 2016, Meijers 2017, Schäfer et al. forthcoming). Although 
European integration has become more relevant to voters during the last two 
decades, voter-party congruence is traditionally believed to matter for electoral 
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behavior mainly regarding the traditional left-right dimension (Downs 1957, 
Riker & Ordeshook 1968, Lefkofridi et al. 2014). In only few instances, the effect 
of other policy dimensions, such as the European integration dimension, has 
been tested for EP elections, albeit with mixed findings (Hobolt et al. 2009, Hobolt 
& Spoon 2012). I therefore aim to understand the degree to which voter-party 
congruence, i.e. the perceived policy representation by political parties, regard-
ing both the ideological left-right conflict and the European integration dimen-
sion matters nowadays for EP election behavior. 
Fifth, although the field of European studies has produced a multitude of schol-
arly works dealing with the politicization of European integration (De Wilde 
2011, Statham & Trenz 2013, De Wilde et al. 2016, Hoeglinger 2016, Hutter et al. 
2016, Anders et al. 2018, Zeitlin et al. 2019), there has been little attention to the 
electoral consequences of this process, in particular for European Parliament elec-
tions. Yet, single studies show that the level of issue salience (De Vries et al. 2011, 
Hobolt & Wittrock 2011, De Vries & Hobolt 2016) as well as the degree of actor 
polarization (Van Spanje & De Vreese 2011, Hobolt & Spoon 2012) can be relevant 
for voting behavior in EP elections. This seems intuitively plausible, as higher 
issue salience provide citizens with more electorally relevant information (see 
also Beach et al. 2018) and higher actor polarization can offer clearer electoral 
choices to voters (see also Hobolt & Hoerner 2019). In this context, it seems im-
portant to also account for the electoral impacts of the European economic and 
debt crisis. The Euro crisis did not only cause people to turn to Eurosceptic par-
ties (Hobolt & De Vries 2016b), but it also led to a stark, yet highly differentiated 
pattern of EU issue politicization across the different EU member states (Hutter 
& Kriesi 2019). Moreover, identifying the effects of the European economic and 
sovereign debt crisis as well as its management by the EU institutions has crucial 
implications for the EU’s political legitimacy, because the Euro crisis represents 
a crisis of (economic) outputs and a crisis of (democratic) inputs at the same time 
(Scharpf 2015), especially in the most severely affected countries. Therefore, I ac-
count for the contextual variation in the politicization of European integration 
when analyzing the impact on preferences towards European integration on EP 
election behavior.  
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In summary, I aim to explore the direct and indirect effects of three independent 
variables – micro-level EU attitudes, meso-level voter-party congruence and macro-
level EU issue politicization – on the individual behavior in EP elections, which 
itself consists of the two dependent variables electoral participation and vote choice. 
The specific research questions of my thesis, which are derived from the literature 
gaps discussed above, are laid out in table 1. 
Table 1: Research questions of the paper-based dissertation 
Independent  
variables 
Research questions 
Attitudes towards 
the EU 
RQ1 Which type of EU attitudes play the most important role for electoral 
behavior in EP elections? 
RQ2 Can attitudes towards the EU explain the turnout gap between na-
tional and European elections? 
RQ3 Which factors condition the electoral choice of Eurosceptic citizens 
between abstaining and voting for anti-EU parties? 
Voter-party  
congruence 
RQ4 Does perceived political representation, i.e. voter-party congruence, 
affect individual EP election behavior?  
RQ5 Which congruence dimension matters most for EP election behavior: 
the left-right conflict or the European integration dimension? 
RQ6 Does perceived political representation affect the way that EU atti-
tudes relate to electoral behavior? 
EU issue  
politicization 
RQ7 Does the level of EU issue politicization in a country affect the way 
that EU attitudes relate to individual behavior in EP elections?  
RQ8 Has the increased politicization of EU issues during the Euro crisis 
affected the impact of EU preferences on EP election behavior? 
 
3.2 Summaries 
In this section, I shortly present all three empirical studies, before jointly discuss-
ing their contributions to the literature on attitudes towards European integra-
tion and EP elections in the following section. Table 2 provides an overview about 
the three single articles which cover different aspects of the overall research in-
terest: Study I deals with RQ1 and RQ2, Study II answers RQ4, RQ5 and RQ8, 
and Study III tackles RQ3, RQ6 and RQ7 (see also tab. 1). As indicated, all three 
studies are based on representative, post-electoral voter surveys from the 
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European Election Studies (EES), which appear to the best openly available data 
source to study individual EP election behavior in a comparative, cross-national 
perspective. While Study I relies on the 2014 EES survey (Schmitt et al. 2016b), 
Study II makes additionally use of the 2009 EES survey (Van Egmond et al. 2013). 
Study III integrates these voter-level data with party-level data extracted from 
the 2014 Euromanifesto study (Schmitt et al. 2016a) consisting of all election pro-
grams published by political parties during the EP election campaign.  
Table 2: Overview of the three empirical studies of the paper-based dissertation 
 Study I Study II Study III 
Title “Euroskeptizismus und 
Wahlenthaltung. Motiva-
tionen unterschiedlicher 
Nichtwählertypen bei der 
Europawahl 2014.” 
“No participation without 
representation. Policy dis-
tances and abstention in 
European Parliament elec-
tions.” 
“Exit or voice? The role of 
political awareness, ideo-
logical congruence and 
party polarization in the 
electoral behavior of Euro-
sceptic citizens.” 
Authorship Single-authored Co-authored  
(with Marc Debus) 
Single-authored 
Research 
questions 
RQ1, RQ2 
 
RQ4, RQ5, RQ8 RQ3, RQ6, RQ7 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Participation Participation Participation + vote 
choice 
Main  
independent 
variables 
Attitudes towards  
the EU, esp.: 
- Institutional trust 
- Regime support 
- European identity 
Voter-party  
congruence on: 
- Left-right conflict 
- European integration 
policy dimension 
Eurosceptic attitudes + : 
- Political awareness 
- Ideological voter-
party congruence 
- Party polarization 
Data EES 2014 voter survey EES 2009 and 2014 
voter surveys 
EES 2014 voter survey, 
Euromanifesto study 
 
In summary, Study I (“Euroskeptizismus und Wahlenthaltung”) sets out to assess 
the impact of attitudes towards the European Union on citizens’ electoral partic-
ipation in European elections. The analytical framework focuses particularly on 
negative, Eurosceptic attitudes and their influence on the tendency to abstain in 
the 2014 EP election. Importantly, I derive three different kinds of EU attitudes 
from the political support concept laid out by Easton (1965, 1975): institutional 
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trust, regime support and identification with the political community. Following 
Blondel et al. (1997, 1998), I differentiate between three groups of non-voters: cir-
cumstantial abstainers, i.e. non-voters who abstain involuntarily, habitual abstain-
ers, i.e. non-voters who rarely or never vote, and EU-only abstainers, i.e. people 
who participate in national elections but abstain in European elections. In the 
empirical analysis based on the EES 2014 voter survey, I estimate multinomial 
logistic regression models with country fixed effects and the replacement of miss-
ing values through multiple imputation. The results show, first, that individual 
trust in EU institutions plays a major role for citizens’ participation in EP elec-
tions – which is much less the case for the other two types of EU attitudes. Second, 
the findings indicate that Eurosceptic attitudes exert a particular effect on EU-
only non-voting, which implies that the difference in voter turnout between na-
tional and European elections – the “Euro gap” (Rose 2004) – is, at least partly, a 
consequence of individual Eurosceptic behavior.  
Study II (“No participation without representation”) investigates how the degree of 
perceived political representation, measured as voter-party policy congruence, 
relates to citizens’ decision whether to participate or not in European Parliament 
elections. Based on the proximity model of electoral behavior (Downs 1957), the 
study aims to compare the impact of distances on the European integration policy 
dimension with the influence of ideological left-right distances. Moreover, I analyze 
these effects in different electoral contexts, in order to identify the conditioning 
effect of the increased politicization during the Euro crisis. In the empirical anal-
ysis based on the 2009 and 2014 EES voter surveys, binary logistic regression 
models yield that only the left-right conflict dimension produces statistically sig-
nificant effects. However, when taking the electoral context into account, it shows 
that voter-party congruence on the European integration dimension is a signifi-
cant predictor of electoral participation in 2014 for countries that are members of 
the Eurozone. This finding implies that the EU policy dimension has gained im-
portance for electoral behavior due to the increased politicization during the Euro 
crisis. 
Study III (“Exit or voice?”) focuses on the individual decision-making process of 
Eurosceptic citizens in European Parliament elections, in particular on the trade-
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off between protest-based abstention (exit) and Eurosceptic voting (voice) follow-
ing the argumentative framework of Hirschman (1970). Based on the rational the-
ory of electoral behavior (Downs 1957), I argue that a voter’s level of political 
awareness, the perceived ideological congruence to Eurosceptic parties and the 
degree of party polarization on EU issues affect the choice of Eurosceptic citizens 
between exit and voice. As mentioned, the empirical analysis integrates citizen-
level and party-level data and is based on a sub-sample of Eurosceptic citizens 
from the 2014 EES voter survey and the 2014 Euromanifesto study. A multino-
mial logistic regression analysis finds that Eurosceptic citizens tend to choose 
voice over exit when they are more interested and knowledgeable in politics, 
when they feel better represented by Eurosceptic parties and when the issue of 
European integration is highly polarized by the political parties in their country. 
In addition, the results demonstrate that protest-based abstention is more likely 
in contexts where political parties fail to represent Eurosceptic citizens and do 
not politicize the issue of European integration. 
 
3.3 Findings and contributions 
This section is concerned with how the three empirical studies summarized 
above help to further our understanding about the nature of European Parlia-
ment elections, with particular regards to the research gaps identified before.  
A first central contribution is the finding that preferences towards European in-
tegration indeed matter for EP election behavior, but they do not employ uniform 
effect across different kinds of EU attitudes. Study I discovers that electoral par-
ticipation is mostly affected by more specific attitudes towards EU institutions, 
such as the European Parliament itself, but not at all by rather diffuse, emotional 
attachments to the European political community, i.e. by a personal identification 
with the EU. The difference between theses preferences is that the former – insti-
tutional trust – has a rather utilitarian origin, whereas the latter has a more affec-
tive character. From the perspective of the political support literature (Easton 
1975, Weßels 2007), this finding implies that citizens’ EP election behavior is 
much more affected by the recent – political and economic – performance of the 
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EU that leads to changes in specific support for the EU (see also Schäfer & Gross 
2020).20 Output failures of the political system, like it occurred during the Euro 
crisis, can then translate into electoral protest, such as EU-only abstention.  
This implication leads to a second important contribution. The difference in turn-
out between European and national level elections is traditionally seen as a core 
feature of the SOE framework. It is usually explained by the fact that there is “less 
at stake” in European elections, by the low salience of EP elections and by peo-
ple’s lack of interest for European affairs (Reif 1984). However, Study I provides 
evidence for the conclusion that EU-only abstention is additionally enhanced by 
Eurosceptic attitudes. Therefore, the Euro gap (Rose 2004) seems to be not only 
the corollary of differences in importance between elections, but also a phenom-
enon that results from a conscious choice of many Eurosceptic citizens. In this 
understanding, the Euro gap seems to be, at least partly, an aggregate-level con-
sequence of individual-level protest-based behavior.  
This conclusion is supported by findings of Study III, which adds another rele-
vant contribution to the literature on EP election behavior. It shows that Euro-
sceptic citizens who aim to express discontent with the EU act in accordance with 
rational choice theory. While protest-based abstention is slightly enhanced by a lack 
of ideologically congruent Eurosceptic parties and low party polarization on Eu-
ropean integration, voting for Eurosceptic parties is strongly enabled by identifying 
ideologically close Eurosceptic parties and high EU issue politicization in a party 
system. This shows that the way in which Eurosceptic citizens express protest in 
EP elections is shaped by several “European” explanatory factors located at dif-
ferent analytical levels. These findings illustrate the different ways in which Eu-
rope matters for citizens during European elections. 
One decisive factor is the degree of perceived political representation by the eli-
gible parties in an EU member state. As it can be seen in Study III, ideological 
representation plays an important role for the way in which Eurosceptic attitudes 
can be translated into Eurosceptic voting behavior. This is because voters do not 
                                                 
20 However, diffuse support forms were not only much less affected by the European crises, but 
also exert little influence on people’s electoral participation. 
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only consider EU preferences when engaging in EU issue voting, but also place 
great emphasis on a party’s ideological profile. Left-Eurosceptic citizens, for ex-
ample, hardly vote for right-wing Eurosceptic parties, and vice versa. In addition, 
perceived political representation on the left-right dimensions also matters for 
individual participation in EP elections. The results of Study II indicate that low 
congruence between voters and parties regarding this basic ideological conflict 
demobilizes voters during EP election campaigns. This conclusion bears an im-
portant meaning for the quality of representative democracy in Europe, as it im-
plies that voters who do not feel represented by existing parties are less likely to 
cast a vote in European elections, which results in a lack of political representa-
tion in the EP and in EU policy-making. Furthermore, Study II finds that although 
the left-right dimension prevails in determining EP election behavior thus lend-
ing support to the SOE framework, the European integration policy dimension 
matters in electoral contexts where EU integration is a highly politicized issue.  
This leads me to another major contribution of this thesis, namely the importance 
of EU issue politicization for the electoral impact of EU preferences. Study II 
demonstrates that political representation on the European integration dimen-
sions affects electoral behavior only after the Euro crisis in the Eurozone member 
states. This rather implicit indication for the conditioning effect of EU issue po-
liticization is supported by the findings of Study III. Here, a more explicit opera-
tionalization of issue politicization, namely a measure for the party (system) po-
larization on European integration, shows that EU issue voting is enhanced in 
party systems that offer clear choices to voters and that carry out conflicts over 
Europe. In essence, these findings imply that the electoral effects of preferences 
towards European integration are highly context-dependent. Where EU issues 
are more politicized by political elites, electoral behavior is more connected to EU 
attitudes and less in accordance with the SOE theory of EP elections. When Europe 
matters for political elites, it apparently also does for voters.  
Interestingly, Study II also finds that indifference and ambivalence towards Eu-
ropean integration is related to a higher tendency of abstaining during EP elec-
tions than clearly positive or negative attitudes. This results not only adds to re-
cent empirical findings regarding the electoral relevance of indifferent and 
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ambivalent EU attitudes (Stoeckel 2013, Van Ingelgom 2014, Kentmen-Cin 2017), 
but also displays that orientations towards European integration can only exert 
electoral effects when these attitudes exist and when they have an either positive 
or negative connotation. When Europe does not matter for people, it will not mat-
ter for their electoral behavior. 
Lastly, all three studies support previous research on electoral behavioral in 
providing evidence that many standard determinants of participation and vote 
choice matter in EP elections. This is particularly true for socio-economic factors 
such as a recent job loss or macro-economic evaluations (see, e.g., Study I), socio-
psychological factors such as political efficacy or party identification (see, e.g., 
Study II), socio-political factors such as government support or contact to politi-
cal parties (see, e.g., Study III) as well as socio-demographic factors such as age, 
gender or education. Most importantly, however, are predictors that relate to the 
concept of political awareness (Zaller 1992). This is most explicitly shown in 
Study III, which yields that the degree of political interest and knowledge are 
central for a Eurosceptic citizen’s choice between ordinary abstention behavior 
and voting for a Eurosceptic party (see also Schäfer 2019). In fact, the great rele-
vance of political awareness supports the assumptions of the SOE framework 
which postulates that the patterns observed in EP elections are a consequence of 
the low salience of these elections to voters. The degree to which Europe matters 
in European elections is, therefore, existent but still limited.  
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4 Discussion 
This dissertation aimed at identifying the impacts of citizen orientations towards 
European integration and the systemic politicization of EU issues on the electoral 
behavior in European elections by conducting three empirical studies which an-
alyzed the determinants of participation and voting behavior in the 2014 EP elec-
tions. The findings of these studies have several implications for our theoretical 
understanding of present-day European elections and for their role in legitimiz-
ing governance on the supranational level.  
On the one hand, it can be concluded that the “second-order election” approach, 
once developed to explain aggregate level patterns of EP election outcomes, re-
mains powerful when explaining electoral choices on the individual level. This is 
indicated by the explanatory power of traditional determinants of election be-
havior, in particular regarding the ideological left-right dimension and an indi-
vidual’s level of political awareness. First, both the participation decision and the 
vote choice in European elections are affected by people’s self-placement and the 
(perceived) positions of political parties on the left-right dimension of political 
conflict. This is also true for Eurosceptic citizens, which do hardly vote for a Eu-
rosceptic party, if it is located at the other end of the ideological spectrum. This 
indicates that the left-right dimension trumps single policy dimensions, such as 
European integration, when it comes to citizens’ electoral behavior. Second, po-
litical awareness is of utmost importance for people’s EP election behavior, espe-
cially regarding their electoral participation. Abstainers in European elections 
are, to a large degree, citizens who are neither interested nor sophisticated in po-
litical matters. In line with the assumptions of the SOE approach, the comparably 
low turnout in EP elections can thus mainly be explained by the low salience and 
perception that there is less at stake in European elections. 
On the other hand, this dissertation demonstrates various ways in which “Eu-
rope matters” in contemporary EP elections. In particular, citizen-based Euro-
scepticism is not only a predictor of ordinary non-voting in EP elections, but it 
also leads people to express this negative attitude by actively staying at home 
during European elections. This protest-based abstention behavior also explains 
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why some people only abstain in European elections, whereas they participate in 
national elections. Moreover, the effects of EU support and political representa-
tion regarding the European integration policy dimension on people’s electoral 
choices in EP elections are shaped by the way in which EU issues are politicized 
by political elites in a given electoral context. In essence, Europe does not matter 
unconditionally for citizens’ electoral behavior, but is moderated by the systemic 
salience and actor polarization regarding the issue of European integration. 
Taken together, both the SOE framework and the Europe matters approach have 
their merits for the EP election literature, as they both continue to explain elec-
toral patterns and individual behavior in European Parliament elections. Overall, 
this thesis contributes to our understanding how “European” explanatory factors 
matter for voters and non-voters when they are confronted with the electoral 
choices in European elections. These contributions have important implications 
regarding the role of EP elections for the legitimacy of the EU’s political system. 
First, although the continuing importance of the SOE approach indicates that the 
legitimizing ability of EP elections is still considerably limited, the individual-
level findings show that European elections fulfill their central function at least 
partly. Nowadays, many citizens actually take preferences towards European in-
tegration into account during European elections. Second, it shows that contem-
porary EP elections are particularly capable of legitimizing EU governance in 
contexts where the issue of European integration is no longer a “sleeping giant”, 
but is politicized by political elites. When parties campaign on Europe and polar-
ize European integration, the issue becomes relevant for voters and, eventually, 
matters during EP elections. In these instances, European elections can be re-
garded as providing legitimacy not only to the European Parliament, but also to 
the EU political system in general. 
However, several limitations and shortcomings of this dissertation are worth a 
critical reflection. Maybe most obviously, the three empirical studies have fo-
cused much more on electoral participation than on voting behavior. Therefore, 
the main findings and contributions appear more relevant for the question why 
citizens take part in EP elections and less for the question why they vote for a 
particular party. However, the assumptions of the SOE and Europe matters 
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approaches concern participation and vote choice alike and their validity can be 
tested in similar ways. In analogy to the EU-only abstainers that were identified in 
this thesis, future empirical research should put particular focus on citizens who 
switch votes between national and European elections, since their characteristics 
and motivations lie at the heart of the debate between the two election theories.  
A second limitation of this thesis is the strong focus on negative attitudes towards 
European integration, commonly labelled as “citizen-based” or “popular” Euro-
scepticism. Yet, the increasing politicization of European integration implies that 
not only opposition towards the EU and further European integration are more 
important in present-day EP elections, but so are more positive orientations to-
wards these objects. Hence, future research could place more importance to the 
electoral behavior of citizens with supportive attitudes and parties who explicitly 
mobilizes with pro-European election campaigns, which has already played a 
role during the most recent 2019 EP elections in many EU member states (Bolin 
et al. 2019).  
Third, although this thesis places much emphasis on the relevance of the Euro-
pean integration issue dimension and the politicization of EU issues for the legit-
imizing function of EP elections, it has to be noted that policy decisions relating 
to more versus less European integration are mostly “taken under the intergov-
ernmental regime and therefore paradoxically are national rather than European 
issues” (Thomassen 2016: 546). In contrast, the ideological left-right axis is not a 
purely domestic or national conflict dimension, but also the most relevant politi-
cal conflict in the European Parliament (Hix et al. 2006). Therefore, some authors 
question one of the core assumptions of the Europe matters approach and state 
that an increased relevance of the European integration dimension in EP elections 
might create “a mismatch between the electoral arena and the parliamentary 
arena” (Thomassen 2016: 546). Although this criticism should not be easily dis-
missed, it seems odd that the legitimizing function of EP elections could be ful-
filled without European issues playing any role for citizens’ electoral behavior in 
European elections. A possible way forward for future research could be the dis-
tinction between “EU polity issues” and “EU policy issues” (Braun et al. 2016). 
While the former concern constitutive issues that are dealt with in 
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intergovernmental national settings, the latter relate to EU policy-making and are 
thus decided in the supranational arena, i.e. the European Parliament (see also 
Mair 2000). From this perspective, it seems important that electoral campaigns 
and voting behavior is not only limited to constitutive polity issues (i.e. more 
versus less European integration), but also refers to specific policy issues at the 
EU level. 
Last but not least, this dissertation also contains some methodological shortcom-
ings which are discussed in greater detail in the three articles. Among them are 
problems with recall questions in surveys due to social desirability, bias towards 
current preferences or forgetfulness (see, e.g., Van Elsas et al. 2014). Moreover, 
there might be problems with the ideological and policy-related self-placement 
of survey respondents, as voters can have different understandings of these 
scales. This concern should be particularly problematic in cross-national surveys, 
but is also relevant for individual variation, for example when it comes to a re-
spondent’s level of political sophistication. In addition, data restrictions in the 
2014 EES made it necessary to estimate average party positions regarding the EU 
issue dimension instead of individually perceived party positions. Finally, the 
operationalization of EU issue politicization is certainly debatable. Apart from 
measuring party polarization via electoral manifestos, one could have also ana-
lyzed other sub-dimensions of issue politicization (e.g., issue salience), other po-
litical actors than parties (e.g., media discourses) or even party-level data from 
other sources (e.g., speeches). Future research should address the methodological 
restrictions mentioned here, in order to confirm the empirical findings and con-
clusions of this thesis.  
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Exit or voice?  
The role of political awareness, ideological congruence and party 
polarization in the electoral behavior of Eurosceptic citizens. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In his seminal book Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Albert Hirschman (1970) describes 
that people have different response options when being dissatisfied with the per-
formance of an organization: they can either “exit” and withdraw from the rela-
tionship to that organization or “voice” their discontent to the organization. 
Transferring this logic to the alternatives that citizens frustrated with a political 
system face in an election yields a similar choice set: they can either withdraw 
from participation (exit) or vote for a system-opposing party (voice) in order to 
signal protest and channel their discontent (Bélanger 2004, Dassonneville et al. 
2015, Hooghe et al. 2011, Kemmers 2017). This paper aims to understand the de-
terminants of this electoral choice for dissatisfied citizens: “Under what conditions 
will the exit option prevail over the voice option and vice versa?” (Hirschman 1970: 59). 
An interesting case to study this question is the behavior of Eurosceptic citizens 
during elections to the European Parliament (EP). In 2014, citizens made exces-
sive use of both options resulting in the lowest overall turnout in the history of 
the EP (42.6%) and the highest ever seat share (~30%) for parties that are critical 
or opposed to the European Union (EU). Empirical research has shown that both 
the tendency to abstain as well as the vote for anti-EU parties in European elec-
tions are consequences of Eurosceptic attitudes among EU citizens (Hernández 
& Kriesi 2016, Hobolt & Spoon 2012). Yet, the EP election literature has left one 
question unanswered: What makes some Eurosceptic citizens actively choose the 
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“exit” option by abstaining, whereas others decide to “voice” their dissatisfaction 
by voting for Eurosceptic parties? 
In this paper, I argue that the choice between protest-based abstention (exit) and 
Eurosceptic voting (voice) is shaped by three important determinants situated on 
different analytical levels. The first factor is the level of individual political 
awareness. The more Eurosceptic citizens receive political information and pos-
sess political knowledge, the rather they are mobilized to vote and can identify a 
party that matches their preferences. Hence, their tendency to vote for a Euro-
sceptic party instead of actively abstaining should increase with their degree of 
political awareness. The second factor takes the supply side of political competi-
tion into account. When Eurosceptic citizens intend to express discontent at the 
ballot boxes, they need a party that they can relate to in ideological terms. The 
more politically represented they feel by Eurosceptic parties in their country, the 
rather they should choose to vote for a Eurosceptic party than to stay at home for 
protest-related reasons. Third, the behavior of Eurosceptic citizens in EP elections 
also depends on whether or not EU issues are politicized by political elites. 
Hence, the more national parties diverge on European integration, the more 
likely should Eurosceptic citizens choose to voice dissatisfaction by voting for a 
Eurosceptic party instead of actively abstaining. 
In the following section, I briefly review the literature on Euroscepticism and EP 
elections, before laying out my theoretical arguments in detail. In section three, I 
empirically test the theoretical hypotheses by analyzing voter survey data pro-
vided by the European Election Studies (EES) and the electoral programs of the 
political parties which competed in the 2014 EP election (Euromanifestos). The 
results show the relevance that all three factors have for the electoral behavior of 
Eurosceptic citizens, especially by increasing the likelihood of Eurosceptic voting 
(voice). In the concluding section, I discuss the implications of the empirical 
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results for our understanding of, first, the electoral behavior of dissatisfied citi-
zens more generally, and second, the nature of contemporary European Parlia-
ment elections. Overall, the unique contribution of this study is a joint approach 
to explain both the participation decision and the vote choice of disaffected voters 
with a common set of explanatory factors located at different analytical levels – 
and a special focus on two reactions to dissatisfaction: exit versus voice. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
2.1. The literature on Euroscepticism and European Parliament elections 
In electoral research, European Parliament elections are – ever since their first 
occurrence – understood to be “second-order national elections” (Reif & Schmitt 
1980). They usually yield lower levels of voter participation, a fall in support for 
governing parties, and a gain in support for smaller parties (see, e.g., Hix & 
Marsh 2011, Schmitt 2005). From the second-order perspective, non-voting can 
be mainly explained by the low importance and salience of EP elections, or 
simply put that “there is less at stake” (Reif 1984: 246) in European elections. Vot-
ing for Eurosceptic parties, on the other hand, is interpreted as a punishment of 
national governments that happened to be consisting of mostly pro-European 
parties (Hix & Marsh 2007). 
However, individual level research of the last two decades has shown the in-
creasing importance of “European” factors for electoral behavior in these supra-
national elections. First, individual participation in EP elections has been diag-
nosed to relate to several European attitudes, such as support for the EU member-
ship of one’s country (Stockemer 2012), trust in EU institutions (Schäfer 2017), 
satisfaction with democracy in the EU (Hobolt & Spoon 2012), as well as 
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knowledge about and interest in European politics (Blondel et al. 1998, Clark 
2014, Schmitt et al. 2015). Moreover, studies on the 2014 EP elections have shown 
that it matters for turnout whether EU issues are politicized in a given context 
(Hernández & Kriesi 2016, Schäfer & Debus 2018). Second, attitudes towards Eu-
ropean integration and the EU also matter for citizens’ vote choice (Clark & 
Rohrschneider 2009, De Vries et al. 2011, Hobolt et al. 2009), especially when EU 
issues are more politicized (Hobolt & Spoon 2012) and with regards to voting for 
Eurosceptic parties (Hernández & Kriesi 2016, Hobolt 2015, Van Spanje & De 
Vreese 2011).21  
A central implication of these findings is that Eurosceptic citizens, i.e. those with 
negative attitudes towards the EU and European integration,22 are more likely 
both to abstain as well as to vote for anti-EU parties during European elections 
than their more Europhile counterparts. Moreover, both individual level atti-
tudes and contextual factors matter for their behavior in EP elections. Yet, it is 
less clear what the reasons are for the respective electoral choice and under which 
conditions Eurosceptic voters choose one option over the other. The lack of 
knowledge on this matter is a remarkable observation, not only because non-vot-
ing and anti-EU voting can be considered as two options of the same electoral 
choice set (Thurner & Eymann 2000), but also because Reif & Schmitt (1980: 10) 
already noted the general applicability of the Hirschman framework to European 
Parliament elections.23 For the most part, however, EP election studies analyzed 
                                                 
21 When citizens vote according to their preferences on European integration, it is commonly 
called “EU issue voting” (De Vries 2007). 
22 Since this article concentrates on the consequences of Eurosceptic attitudes, I leave aside a dis-
cussion on their determinants. Useful overviews are provided by Boomgaarden et al. (2011) as 
well as by Hobolt and De Vries (2016a). 
23 As notable exceptions, Giebler et al. (2017) and Weber (2011) use the Hirschman framework to 
study the effects of media information and national electoral cycles in the context of European 
Parliament elections. 
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the effects of dissatisfaction with the EU on turnout and Eurosceptic voting sep-
arately (e.g., Hernández & Kriesi 2016, Hobolt & Spoon 2012).24 
 
2.2. A theoretical framework for the electoral choice of Eurosceptic citi-
zens in EP elections 
If Eurosceptic citizens aim to actively express their dissatisfaction during EP elec-
tions, they are faced with two viable options: non-voting (exit) and voting for 
anti-EU parties (voice). Both choices bear the potential to constitute severe threats 
to the future of the European integration process. This is, first, because electoral 
participation is “commonly regarded as one major indicator of the health of a 
democracy, reflecting trust and confidence in the political system” (Norris 1997: 
281). Thus, an increasing number of non-voters in European elections could indi-
rectly undermine the legitimacy of the EU.25 In this regard, “not casting a ballot 
is one way of expressing opposition to the European political system and the in-
tegration process” (Steinbrecher & Rattinger 2012: 171). Second, a greater seat 
share of system-opposing parties in the European Parliament might seriously af-
fect the way that this institution functions, which means that voting for Euro-
sceptic parties could contribute to an erosion of the EU from within. Also, when 
anti-EU politicians obtain seats in the EP, they can express critical views about 
the EU and thereby give “voice” to the concerns of Eurosceptic citizens. 
Since the latter mechanisms are much more directly affecting the EU’s legitimacy 
and stability, I argue that Eurosceptic citizens view voice as a more effective way 
                                                 
24 One explanation for this gap in the literature is that political sociology usually distinguishes 
between electoral participation and voting behavior as two different objects of analysis. 
25 Consequently, the comparatively lower turnout in EP elections adds to the EU’s alleged demo-
cratic deficit (Flickinger & Studlar 2007: 386), but usually plays a minor role in this debate 
(Føllesdal & Hix 2006). 
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to punish and destabilize the EU than exit. Hence, Eurosceptic voting should be 
the preferred option that opponents of the EU and the European integration pro-
cess choose to channel their discontent. However, where Eurosceptic parties are 
not available or identifiable, non-voting still seems like a rational choice for peo-
ple who intend to protest against European integration and to punish the EU.  
Based on rational choice theory, I argue that three central factors facilitate a citi-
zen’s ability to engage in Eurosceptic voting: (1) individual political awareness, 
(2) Eurosceptic parties that the voter can ideologically relate to, and (3) a political 
context where political parties diverge in their stance on European integration, 
i.e. where there is a high degree of party polarization on EU issues. These three 
determinants are situated on different analytical levels, depending on whether 
they are characteristics of the voter (micro-level), of the party system (macro-
level) or a combination of the two (meso-level). Figure 1 visualizes the theoretical 
model that I use to explain the electoral behavior of Eurosceptic citizens, espe-
cially when it comes to choosing between protest-based abstaining (exit) and Eu-
rosceptic voting (voice).  
However, the model does not assume that all non-voters abstain due to political 
dissatisfaction. The literature on electoral participation shows that many other 
factors contribute to conventional non-voting. Among those, the most common 
explanatory approaches of individual turnout include certain sociodemographic, 
socioeconomic and sociopsychological variables as well as mobilization efforts 
during electoral campaigns and institutional features of the electoral system (see 
Blais 2006, Smets & Van Ham 2013). It is therefore essential to differentiate be-
tween ordinary abstention from protest-based abstention, as only the latter can be 
captured with the concept of “exit” in the sense of Hirschman, i.e. as a behavioral 
reaction to personal discontent. Moreover, the model here does not exclude the 
possibility that Eurosceptic citizens vote for pro-European parties, because, for 
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example, they feel emotionally attached to these parties or base their vote choice 
on other political issues. Therefore, the theoretical arguments developed in the 
following section will also account for the possibility of ordinary abstention and 
voting for another, non-Eurosceptic party in EP elections. Nevertheless, the main 
focus lies in understanding the factors that shape the electoral choice between 
protest-based abstention (exit) and Eurosceptic voting (voice).  
Figure 1: Theoretical explanatory model  
 
 
2.3. Individual political awareness 
Citizens are not equally informed about politics. Some are more interested in pol-
itics, follow political developments more closely, and have a deeper understand-
ing of political processes than others. Zaller calls the “extent to which an individ-
ual pays attention to politics and understands what he or she has encountered” 
(Zaller 1992: 21) political awareness.26 According to his definition, the concept con-
sists of a motivational component (interest) and a cognitive ability component 
                                                 
26 In the literature the term political awareness is often used interchangeably with similar con-
cepts, such as political knowledge, political sophistication and political information. Although I 
therefore also use the other terms, the concept of political awareness is deliberately chosen, in 
order to grasp the combination of political interest for political information and the capability to 
understand them. 
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(competence). From a theoretical perspective, both components are essential for 
the rational choice model of voting behavior (Downs 1957). In order to gain ben-
efits from voting, people need to receive and process information about the po-
litical offers, so they can identify a party that shares their own political prefer-
ences. For these reasons, individual political awareness affects the decision who 
to vote for and whether to vote at all. 
Empirical research supports these assumptions. On the one hand, the more po-
litical interest and knowledge citizens possess, the rather they participate in elec-
tions (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996, Larcinese 2007, Lassen 2005, Smets & Van 
Ham 2013), also regarding EP elections (Bhatti 2010, Hernández & Kriesi 2016, 
Hogh & Larsen 2016). On the other hand, political awareness matters for voting 
behavior by moderating the interplay between existing political predispositions 
and the processing of new political information (Neuman 1986: 177). Hobolt 
(2005) shows this conditioning role for the case of EU referenda, where political 
awareness moderates the relationship between EU attitudes, elite cues and vot-
ing behavior. As a consequence, politically sophisticated citizens have a higher 
chance to vote “correctly”, i.e. according to their own political preferences (Rapeli 
2018). 
During European Parliament elections political awareness plays an even greater 
role, as European elections are usually less salient than national elections. For 
Eurosceptic citizens, there are two ways in which their level of political aware-
ness matters for their electoral behavior (Schäfer 2019). First, higher political in-
terest results in a greater chance of knowing about the election and being mobi-
lized to express discontent with the EU at the polls. Second, greater political 
knowledge facilitates correct EU issue voting, meaning that voters have better 
chances to identify parties’ stances on EU issues and to vote according to their 
(negative) preferences on European integration (De Vries et al. 2011, Hobolt & 
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Wittrock 2011). This is supported by the findings of Beach et al. (2018) who show 
that EP election campaigns “provide information that enables voters to make de-
cisions based on EU issues” (Beach et al. 2018: 792). 
Therefore, I hypothesize that when Eurosceptic citizens are more politically 
aware, i.e. more interested and knowledgeable, they should have a higher prob-
ability of voting for a Eurosceptic party (voice). The likelihood of protest-based 
abstention (exit), in contrast, should be barely affected by the degree of a person’s 
political awareness. Instead, higher political awareness should increase also the 
tendency to vote for other parties, as it is a strong mobilizing factor. In contrast, 
lower individual political awareness should rather lead to ordinary abstention be-
havior, as citizens with little interest in politics can be expected to be rather indif-
ferent about European elections (hypothesis 1). 
 
2.4. Ideological voter-party congruence 
A second factor shaping citizens’ electoral behavior is situated at the meso-level 
of political competition, i.e. at the intersection between individual voters and po-
litical parties. According to Downs (1957), voters choose the party that best rep-
resents their policy preferences, so that their personal utility is maximized when 
the chosen party is successful in the election. But ideological distances between 
voters and eligible parties do not only matter for vote choice, but also influences 
whether people turn out to vote at all (Lefkofridi et al. 2014) and how satisfied 
they are with the democracy they live in (Stecker & Tausendpfund 2016). This is, 
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because in the absence of ideologically congruent parties, voters have no chance 
of increasing their personal utility by the act of voting.27 
The relevance of ideological representation for European Parliament elections 
has been underlined on several occasions, especially in studies on electoral par-
ticipation and voting behavior (Hobolt et al. 2009, Hobolt & Wittrock 2011, Ho-
bolt & Spoon 2012, Schäfer & Debus 2018).28 Hence, the degree to which people 
feel ideologically close to eligible parties matters for whether they turn out to 
vote and who they vote for. This should be particularly true for Eurosceptic citi-
zens, who often place themselves at the extremes of the left-right spectrum (De 
Vries & Edwards 2009, Van Elsas & Van der Brug 2015) and can thus be easily 
alienated when there is no party occupying their ideological space.29  
However, it is important at which end of the axis Eurosceptics locate themselves, 
because the basic motivations for opposing the EU are different depending on 
the underlying political ideology. Left Eurosceptic citizens hold negative views on 
the EU because of the market-liberal character of the European integration pro-
cess, whereas right Eurosceptics believe that European integration poses a threat 
to national sovereignty and their cultural identity.30 This implies that although 
Eurosceptics share similar attitudes towards the EU, they differ in their position 
                                                 
27 Generally speaking, ideological and policy-related factors have become more important in peo-
ple’s voting decision following the phenomenon of electoral de-alignment in the second half of 
the 20th century (Lachat 2008: 687). 
28 In these studies, the degree of voter-party congruence is usually analyzed by using a single left-
right dimension, but has occasionally also been tested with various policy dimensions.  
29 Indeed, Lefkofridi et al. (2014: 304) find that “the logic of refraining from electoral politics due 
to lack of congruent options does not apply to all citizens equally: citizens holding ideologically 
extreme positions […] are [the] most likely to abstain when their positions are not congruent with 
available party positions”. 
30 These different ideological origins cause the so-called inverted-U curve that characterizes the 
relationship between positions on European integration and positions on the ideological left-right 
dimension (Hooghe et al. 2002, Van Elsas & Van der Brug 2015). 
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on main ideological conflicts, which should influence their voting behavior. 
Therefore, an eligible Eurosceptic party in a country is a necessary but not a suf-
ficient condition for a Eurosceptic citizen to choose voice over exit. Instead, it is 
important that a voter can relate to this party and feels ideologically represented.  
Based on this reasoning, I hypothesize that the more ideologically represented 
Eurosceptic citizens feel by the eligible Eurosceptic parties in their country, the 
more likely they should vote for a Eurosceptic party (voice). On the other side, the 
larger the ideological distance between a Eurosceptic voter’s own position and 
the position of the closest anti-EU party becomes, the greater is the incentive to 
abstain from voting to express protest (exit). While the likelihood of ordinary ab-
stention should not be connected to ideological representation by Eurosceptic 
parties, it seems reasonable to assume that the chance of voting for other parties 
increases if motivated Eurosceptics do not find a congruence anti-EU party (hy-
pothesis 2). 
 
2.5. Party polarization of the European integration issue 
European integration has – more and more – become a contested issue in the na-
tional political systems across Europe. One main feature of this “politicization” 
process is the increasing polarization of preferences that political actors take on 
the issue of European integration (De Wilde et al. 2016, Hutter et al. 2016).31 How-
ever, this process has not only varied over time in Europe32, but is also “highly 
differentiated across countries” (Kriesi 2016: 36). Hence, in some contexts 
                                                 
31 Other facets of EU issue politicization – defined as the “expansion of the scope of conflict within 
the political system” (Hutter et al. 2016: 8) – are increasing salience and actor expansion (De Wilde 
et al. 2016: 4). 
32 In fact, the process of EU issue politicization has not been steady over the course of the Euro-
pean unification process, but rather “punctuated” or “intermittent” (Kriesi 2016: 34). 
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political parties occupy more extreme positions on the European integration is-
sue than in others. In particular, the rise of Eurosceptic parties has been the main 
driver of EU issue politicization within the last decade and it has made Euroscep-
tic attitudes “politically and electorally relevant” (Kriesi 2016: 32) in many EU 
member states. The degree of party polarization, which is situated on the macro-
level of political competition, therefore presents another important explanatory 
factor for the electoral behavior of Eurosceptic citizens. 
The reason is that when political parties occupy more disperse positions on an 
issue, then more party-related information about this issue are available and the 
positions of parties are more clearly distinguishable. This can help voters to iden-
tify the different positions of political parties, offers them real choices and 
thereby makes an issue in question electorally relevant (Carmines & Stimson 
1989, Vegetti et al. 2017). Empirical research provides evidence to these claims, 
as party polarization has been found to affect both electoral participation and 
voting behavior (Dalton 2008, Lachat 2008, Steiner & Martin 2012). This is also 
true for polarization on certain policy issues which can enhance people’s ten-
dency to vote on this issue (Lachat 2011). 
In European elections, polarization on the European integration issue dimension 
exerts similar conditioning effects, as it seems that “voters only take EU-specific 
considerations into account when political parties provide them with clear 
choices” (Hobolt & Spoon 2012: 719). It has been repeatedly shown that the de-
gree of party conflict on European integration affects vote choices in EP elections 
(De Vries & Hobolt 2016, Hobolt & Spoon 2012, Van Spanje & De Vreese 2011). 
For the 2014 EP elections, Hernández and Kriesi (2016) show that the presence 
and the mobilization efforts of anti-EU parties have increased the impact of EU 
attitudes for both participation and vote choice. These findings are supported by 
other studies which underline the importance of the European integration issue 
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dimension in Eurozone member states that have been severely affected by the 
economic and sovereign debt crisis (Schäfer & Debus 2018). 
Therefore, I hypothesize that Eurosceptic citizens are more likely to vote for a 
Eurosceptic party (voice) and less likely to abstain for protest-related reasons (exit) 
in party systems where the European integration issue is more polarized. In con-
trast, the likelihood of ordinary abstention and of voting for another party should 
not be affected by party polarization regarding the issue of European integration 
(hypothesis 3). 
Table 1: Summary of the hypotheses 
 
Table 1 summarizes the theoretical expectations derived in the previous sections. 
In short, a Eurosceptic citizen’s tendency to choose the voice option, i.e. to vote 
for a Eurosceptic party, should be increased with higher political awareness, 
higher ideological voter-party congruence and higher party polarization on Eu-
ropean integration. The option to actively abstain for protest-related reasons 
(exit) should be enhanced by lower ideological representation and lower party 
polarization on EU issues, whereas it should not be affected by individual polit-
ical awareness. The chances for ordinary abstention behavior should increase 
with low political awareness, whereas I do not expect any effect for ideological 
congruence and party polarization on European integration. Lastly, the 
 Protest-based 
abstention 
(exit) 
Vote for a  
Eurosceptic 
party (voice) 
Ordinary 
abstention 
Vote for an-
other party 
H1: Individual political 
awareness 
o + -- + 
H2: Ideological voter-
party congruence  
-- + o -- 
H3: Party polarization 
on EU integration 
-- + o o 
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probability of voting for another, non-Eurosceptic party can be reasonably ex-
pected to increase for Eurosceptic citizens with higher political awareness and 
lower ideological congruence with Eurosceptic parties, whereas party polariza-
tion on EU issues should be a relevant factor. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
3.1. Research design and operationalization 
In order to empirically test the theoretically derived hypotheses, I model the elec-
toral choice as a simultaneous decision problem. Thurner and Eymann (2000) ar-
gue that this approach is justified on both theoretical and empirical grounds, 
since many factors determining the voting decision also affect the participation 
decision, and vice versa.33 Orientations towards the political system, parties and 
issues, for example, all relate to both turnout and vote choice. Hence, the two 
decisions are inter-connected and are modeled here in a single step, which in-
cludes the two forms of abstention in the electoral choice set of voters (Hooghe 
et al. 2011: 1058, Lacy & Burden 1999: 234). Accordingly, I estimate multinomial 
logistic regression models to identify the impact of the three main independent 
variables on the behavior of Eurosceptic citizens in the 2014 EP election. 
                                                 
33 The assumption behind this design is that the turnout decision and the voting decision are not 
two separate steps in a multi-stage decision where one decision hierarchically follows the other. 
Such a view would imply that citizens either first choose their preferred party before deciding 
whether to participate or that they first decide upon their participation before choosing a party. 
Both hierarchical decision assumptions seem far-fetched. Moreover, empirical tests confirm that 
modeling participation and vote choice simultaneously by non-hierarchical multinomial logit 
models appropriate and that “a hierarchical nesting structure is not necessary” (Thurner & Ey-
mann 2000: 72). 
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The most comprehensive dataset available for this analysis is the post-electoral 
voter survey of the European Election Studies (EES) 2014 (Schmitt et al. 2016b). 
It contains around 30,000 interviews conducted in all 28 EU member states within 
one month after the EP election of 2014.34 However, six countries are left out of 
the analysis, because no Eurosceptic parties have either competed for mandates 
or eventually received any seats in the European Parliament.35 To identify re-
spondents who hold Eurosceptic attitudes I make use of an EU support indicator 
developed by Hernández and Kriesi (2016) recurs on the political support concert 
laid out by Easton (1975) applied to the political system of the EU (Weßels 2007). 
It combines attitudes towards the EU’s political system in general, its regime au-
thorities (the EU institutions) and the political community of the EU into a single 
additive index scaled to a range from 0 to 1.36 Respondents who score lower than 
0.5 on this EU support index are defined as Eurosceptic.37 This leaves us with a 
sub-sample of 7,006 respondents from 22 countries, which is around a third 
(31.3%) of all respondents with non-missing values for the sub-indicators of the 
EU support index (N=22,712). 
The dependent variable is the self-reported behavior of Eurosceptic citizens in the 
2014 EP elections, measured as a nominal variable with four categories: protest-
                                                 
34 The basic sample design applied in all states is a multi-stage, random (probability) sample. All 
interviews were conducted face-to-face in people's homes and in the appropriate national lan-
guage using CAPI for the data capture. 
35 These countries are Croatia, Estonia, Luxemburg, Malta, Romania and Slovenia. For the same 
reason., I excluded respondents from Northern Ireland who are part of the larger UK sample. 
36 More specifically, the three sub-dimensions are operationalized using questions regarding the 
EU membership of one’s own country, trust in the EU institutions and emotional attachment to 
the EU (see tab. A-1 in appendix for the exact wording). The three items correlate with each other 
rather strongly (Pearson r between 0.51 and 0.59) and show an alpha value of 0.77 revealing the 
internal consistency of the indicator. The three indicators equally contribute to the overall EU 
support index. 
37 The empirical results are robust to alternative operationalizations of Euroscepticism, such as 
different absolute thresholds or relative, country-specific thresholds (e.g., a score that is more 
than one standard deviation lower than the national average). 
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based abstention (exit), ordinary abstention, voting for a Eurosceptic party (voice) 
and voting for another, non-Eurosceptic party.38 Whether a non-voter abstained 
for protest-related reasons is captured by an item asking respondents to indicate 
“the main reasons” why they did not vote in the recent EP election. Their absten-
tion is characterized as protest-based, when they mentioned – exclusively or by 
majority – reasons that can be related to political dissatisfaction.39 Regarding the 
vote choice of those respondents who participated in the election, I use an objec-
tive, behavioral operationalization to categorize the respective political parties. I 
assign the notion “Eurosceptic” to parties that have formed the political groups 
ECR, GUE/NGL (“soft” Eurosceptic parties), EFDD and ENL (“hard” Euroscep-
tic parties)40 in the European Parliament after the election (see Brack & Startin 
2015, Hobolt & De Vries 2016b).41 Within the Eurosceptic sub-sample of the EES, 
20.5% of the respondents abstained due to protest-related reasons (n=1,433) and 
34,1% due to other reasons (n=2,388), whereas 16.8% of the respondents voted 
for Eurosceptic party (n=1,177) and 15.2% voted for a another, non-Eurosceptic 
party42 (n=1,063).43  
                                                 
38 The notion of abstention also includes a small number of respondents who reported they “voted 
blank” (n=84, 3.5% of all non-voters), as this can be a form of exit, especially in electoral contexts 
with compulsory voting. 
39 Those reasons are: “lack of trust in or dissatisfaction with politics in general”, “not really satis-
fied with the European Parliament as an institution”, “opposed to the EU” and “vote has no con-
sequences or vote does not change anything”. In total, respondents were allowed to choose be-
tween 17 different reasons (including “other” and “don’t know”), from which they could indicate 
maximum three. 
40 The results of the empirical analysis do not considerably change when I distinguish between 
voters of soft and hard Eurosceptic parties. Therefore, I have decided not to differentiate the de-
pendent variable even further. 
41 In addition, I also categorize four parties without group affiliation as Eurosceptic parties: Jobbik 
(Hungary), Golden Dawn (Greece), the Communist Party of Greece and the National Democratic 
Party of Germany. 
42 As “other, non-Eurosceptic parties”, I understand the political parties sitting in the political 
groups EPP, S&D, ALDE and GREENS/EFA. 
43 The remaining 13.5% of the observations (n=945) are dropped, because they were not assignable 
to any of the four main categories. Most of these respondents refused to answer the question or 
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Regarding the three main independent variables, individual level political aware-
ness is measured by an additive index capturing the two components of the the-
oretical concept formulated by Zaller (1992).44 The motivational component is 
measured by people’s subjective political interest45, while the cognitive compo-
nent is operationalized with seven factual knowledge questions regarding both 
national and European politics.46 The meso-level independent variable capturing 
the ideological congruence between Eurosceptic voters and eligible Eurosceptic 
parties is calculated by computing the absolute distance between a respondent’s 
self-placement on the 11-point left-right axis and the individually perceived po-
sition of the closest Eurosceptic party on the same ideological scale.47 Both varia-
bles are rescaled to range from 0 (low awareness, low congruence) to 1 (high 
awareness, high congruence).48 
To capture the macro-level party polarization on European integration, I use infor-
mation from the 2014 Euromanifestos dataset (Schmitt et al. 2016a) which con-
tains all electoral programs published by political parties that competed in the 
2014 European Parliament elections.49 The main reason to make use of this data 
                                                 
did not remember their electoral behavior, whereas the rest have voted for parties that eventually 
did not receive any seats in the European Parliament. 
44 The medium-strong correlation between both indicators (r = 0.38) reveals that they are indeed 
related, but still capture distinct aspects of political awareness. 
45 Subjective political interest is measured by the respondent’s answer to the statement “you are 
very interested in politics” on a four-point scale ranging from “yes, definitely” to “no, not at all”. 
46 Two questions concern the EU, two refer to the respondent’s national political system and the 
last three relate to the Spitzenkandidaten in the 2014 EP elections (see tab. A-1 in the appendix). All 
seven questions are added using a summated scaling technique (the Cronbach alpha value of 0.62 
shows an acceptable internal consistency). 
47 The notion of a party being “Eurosceptic” is the same as used when constructing the dependent 
variable.  
48 See appendix for the distribution of the dependent variable (fig. A-1) and central independent 
variables (fig. A-2), also in comparison between the full sample and the Eurosceptic sub-sample 
of the EES (fig. A-3).  
49 The original dataset contains 942 manifestos from all EU member states. Included are parties 
that have been represented in the EP at least once and did not stop being represented for two or 
more consecutive legislative periods. 
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source is that manifestos most clearly express the official programmatic position 
of parties on the issue of European integration. Moreover, the cross-national 
character of the dataset and the time of their publication makes it an ideal source 
to combine it with the 2014 EES voter survey and, thus, to study the effects of 
party system factors on individual electoral behavior. For analyzing their con-
tent, the election programs have been coded according to a procedure from the 
Comparative Manifesto project50, which implies that the manifestos are broken 
down in “quasi-sentences” as coding units.51  
A party system’s polarization regarding the European integration issue is calcu-
lated using Dalton’s (2008) polarization index applied to the EU policy dimension 
(see also Lachat 2011). For that purpose, all manifesto categories that are part of 
the “pro-anti-EU” scale of the Euromanifestos dataset (Schmitt et al. 2016a) are 
integrated into a logarithmic pro-anti-EU scale52 resulting in a particular “EU 
score” for each manifesto/party.53 The degree of EU issue polarization in a party 
system is then calculated as the standard deviation of the parties’ weighted EU 
positions, where a party system’s “mean EU score” is weighted by national elec-
tion vote shares54: 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௝  
= ට෍ 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒௜ × ൣ൫𝐸𝑈𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒௜ − 𝐸𝑈𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒ఫതതതതതതതതതതതത൯ ÷ 5൧
ଶ  
                                                 
50 For more information see: https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu.  
51 Every single unit is then assigned a content category (an issue or a policy area), an evaluation 
of its connotation (positive or negative), and a political level that it relates to (European, national 
or unspecified). 
52 Such a scale constructed with the “logit scaling technique” (Lowe et al. 2011, Prosser 2014) 
“combines the advantages of both additive and ratio scaling methods for manifesto data, whilst 
avoiding the problem of polarization found in ratio scales, with the additional benefit of a dimin-
ishing impact of repeated emphasis, mirroring natural language” (Prosser 2016: 739). 
53 𝐸𝑈𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒௜ = log(∑ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝐸𝑈 𝑄𝑆௜ + 0.5) − log(∑ 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝐸𝑈 𝑄𝑆௜ + 0.5). 
54 𝐸𝑈𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒௝ = ∑ 𝐸𝑈𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒௜ × 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒௜ ∑ 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒௜⁄ . 
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Several variables that belong to the standard repertoire in electoral research will 
be controlled for in the analysis. On the individual level, I include measures for 
internal political efficacy, party identification, left-right self-placement (and its 
squared term), as well as mobilization efforts by political parties and other actors. 
Moreover, I also include the EU support indicator described above and a measure 
for support for the national government. Since electoral behavior – both in terms 
of vote choice as well as turnout – is also influenced by economic conditions 
(Rosenstone 1982, Weschle 2014), I furthermore include variables that reflect per-
sonal economic hardship and macro-economic evaluations.55 Another important 
factor for individual turnout is a sense of civic duty to vote (Blais & Achen 2019, 
Downs 1957) that I cannot directly control for due to lack of an appropriate sur-
vey item. However, I model the absence of civic duty by including a dummy 
variable that captures all respondents who indicate that they “rarely or never 
vote”. Besides, I also control for the sociodemographic features age (and its 
squared term), gender, and education level. All individual level independent var-
iables are scaled to a range from 0 to 1 (except for the respondent’s age) Lastly, 
several country level variables that are usually included in studies on EP election 
behavior, namely compulsory voting, years passed since the last national election 
(electoral cycle) and the unemployment rate as a measure for the macro-economic 
situation in a country (see, e.g. Hernández & Kriesi 2016) as provided by Euro-
stat.56 
                                                 
55 The first reflects ego-tropic, pocketbook considerations, namely whether respondents have ex-
perienced a job loss or an income decline in their households within the last two years (Hobolt & 
De Vries 2016b). The second indicator reflects retrospective socio-tropic economic evaluations 
that are traditionally important in electoral research (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2000). 
56 See the appendix for the exact operationalization of all variables (tab. A-1), the summary statis-
tics of all individual level variables for Eurosceptic and non-Eurosceptic citizens (tab. A-2) and 
the summary statistics of the country level variables for all EU member states included in the 
analysis (tab. A-3). 
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3.2. Results 
In this section, I present the results of multinomial logistic regression models that 
aim to identify the effects of the independent variables on the electoral choice of 
Eurosceptic citizens between ordinary abstention, protest-based abstention (exit), 
voting for a Eurosceptic party (voice) and voting for another party. The nested 
structure of the cross-national data and the multi-level nature of the theoretical 
hypotheses demand an appropriate estimation method.57 While there still is a 
lively debate about the most appropriate regression design to analyze clustered 
data (Huang 2016, Möhring 2012, Stapleton et al. 2016, Stegmueller 2013), I opt 
to use a rather conservative “design effect adjusted standard errors” (DA) ap-
proach (Huang 2016).58 This choice implies that I compute standards errors which 
take the country-clustered data structure into account, when estimating the max-
imum likelihood models. Table 2 displays the regression results of an individual 
level-only model (M1) and a joint individual-country-level model (M2), whereas 
the coefficients are expressed as average marginal effects (AMEs) using an ob-
served-value approach (Hanmer & Kalkan 2013).59 
                                                 
57 A variance decomposition shows that 88.9% of the total variance is located at the individual 
level, whereas 11.1% of the total variance is situated at the country level. 
58 Alternatives to such an approach would be a country fixed effects (FE) design or multi-level 
models (MLM) approach. However, both alternatives come with serious shortcomings. FE mod-
els are well suited to estimate the effects of individual level variables, as they are unaffected by 
omitted variables on the macro-level. But they do not allow to model the effects of country-level 
predictors, which is central for the research question here. MLM, on the other hand, allow for 
estimating country-level effects, but rest on methodological assumptions that are not fulfilled 
here (e.g., random samples on both analytical levels). Moreover, the number of higher-level units 
here is considered to be too small for correct maximum likelihood estimations and MLM are 
prone to omitted variable bias due to the low number of degrees of freedom (Möhring 2012, Sta-
pleton et al. 2016, Stegmueller 2013). 
59 The appendix includes the full regression results with the logit coefficients of all independent 
variables, even for a model with control variables only (tab. A-4, A-5 and A-6). In order to show 
the robustness of the DA approach, I have additionally estimated a FE model (tab. A-7) and a 
 
  80 
 
Table 2: Explaining the electoral behavior of Eurosceptic citizens (multinomial 
regression analysis) 
 M1: Individual-level model M2: Individ. & country-level model 
Dependent variable 
(electoral choices) 
Ordin. 
abstent.  
Protest- 
based 
abstent. 
(exit) 
Vote f. 
Eurosc. 
party 
(voice) 
Vote f. 
other 
party 
Ordin. 
abstent. 
Protest- 
based 
abstent. 
(exit) 
Vote f. 
Eurosc. 
party 
(voice) 
Vote f. 
other 
party 
Political awareness -0.42*** 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
0.36*** 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
-0.41*** 
(0.04) 
-0.00 
(0.04) 
0.32*** 
(0.04) 
0.10* 
(0.04) 
Ideological congruence 
to Eurosceptic parties 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.12** 
(0.04) 
0.43*** 
(0.07) 
-0.27*** 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.08* 
(0.03) 
0.38*** 
(0.07) 
-0.28*** 
(0.04) 
Party polarization on 
European integration 
    -0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
Individ.-level controls Included Included 
Country level controls Not included Included 
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.20 
N 3,415 3,415 
Notes: The observations are Eurosceptic citizens (clustered in 22 countries), the coefficients are the average 
marginal effects (AMEs) that each independent variable exerts on the respective outcome category of the 
dependent variable, displayed in parentheses are cluster-corrected standard errors, significance levels: * p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, see appendix for full results including all control variables (expressed in logit 
coefficients). 
 
The results are largely in line with the theoretical expectations. First, increasing 
political awareness (H1) makes Eurosceptic citizens prefer the voice option over 
other choices, whereas the likelihood of abstaining decreases significantly. How-
ever, this only applies to the ordinary form of abstention, since choosing exit is 
not affected by a citizen’s awareness level. There is even a small positive effect 
on the choice to vote for a non-Eurosceptic party, which reveals the strong mobi-
lization effect of political interest and knowledge. Second, increasing ideological 
congruence between Eurosceptic voters and Eurosceptic parties (H2) has a re-
markably strong effect on an individual’s tendency to choose voice. In contrast, 
the chance for protest-based abstention decreases, which shows that exit becomes 
                                                 
MLM (tab. A-8) that can be found in the appendix. The results show that the findings are similar 
and, essentially, not sensitive to the method used. 
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more attractive when voters do not feel ideologically represented by the eligible 
Eurosceptic parties. While ordinary abstention is unaffected by ideological dis-
tances, it also becomes apparent that stronger congruence increases the chance to 
vote for other parties, even if those are not Eurosceptic. Evidently, left-right ide-
ology is not only relevant for electoral participation, but is an even stronger de-
terminant of vote choice.  
Third, the degree of party polarization on European integration (H3) matters for a 
Eurosceptic citizen’s electoral choice between exit and voice. Higher polarization 
simultaneously increases the likelihood of Eurosceptic voting and decreases the 
chance to abstain for protest-related reasons. In contrast, the two remaining op-
tions do not vary with the degree that political parties are divided on EU issues.  
Figure 2: Predicted probabilities for the electoral choices exit and voice among 
Eurosceptic citizens (in function of the three main independent variables) 
 
Note: The model predictions follow from the full DA model (M2) and are calculated using an observed 
value approach, the shaded areas represent 95 % confidence intervals, the representative values for political 
awareness and ideological congruence range from 0 (low) to 1 (high), while they range from 0 (low) to 5 
(high) for party polarization, the predictions for the two other electoral options can be seen in the appendix 
(fig. A-4, A-5 and A-6). 
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Since AMEs only demonstrate the average effect of an independent variable and 
are not very graphic, I additionally calculated predicted probabilities for the out-
come categories of the dependent variables for different levels of the three central 
independent variables. This is, again, done with an observed-values approach for 
the full DA model (M2), of which figure 2 displays only the electoral choices exit 
and voice in order to keep the graph demonstrative and in line with the original 
research interest.60 The model predictions visualize the relevance of all three fac-
tors for the likelihood to voice discontent at the ballot boxes instead of exiting from 
political participation. 
First, while the predicted probability of voting for a Eurosceptic party is only 
11.6% for uninterested and uninformed Eurosceptic citizens, it ascends to 43.7% 
for highly interested and knowledgeable individuals. In contrast, the probability 
of abstaining for protest-related reasons does not significantly vary with the level 
of political awareness and stays around 20-22%. As mentioned, low political 
awareness tends to make Eurosceptic citizens stay at home. However, those peo-
ple abstain primarily, because they are not interested or not affected, but not in 
order to express protest and dissatisfaction. While the predicted probability of 
ordinary abstention is only 14.5% for highly aware Eurosceptics, it amounts to 
54.6% for those who show the lowest awareness level (see also fig. A-4).  
Second, ideological voter-party congruence significantly affects Eurosceptic citi-
zens’ tendency to vote for parties that are opposed to the EU. While the probabil-
ity of voice is only marginal (4.1%) for those who show maximum ideological dis-
tance to Eurosceptic parties, it rises up to 33.2% for Eurosceptic citizens who are 
                                                 
60 See appendix for the graphically visualized model predictions of all four categories of the de-
pendent variable (fig. A-4, A-5 and A-6). 
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fully congruent. Although the probability to exit decreases with higher ideologi-
cal congruence (from 22.6% to 19.1%), this change is not statistically significant 
on the 95% level. Since this prediction is similar to the one for ordinary absten-
tion, we can conclude that ideological representation is not a major factor for Eu-
rosceptic citizens’ participation decision. Rather, it greatly matters for their vote 
choice, which is also underlined by the stark decrease (from 43.9% to 13.5%) in 
the likelihood of voting for another, non-Eurosceptic party (see fig. A-5). A lack 
of political representation thus makes Eurosceptic citizens rather change their 
vote choice than stay at home during European elections. 
Third, party polarization regarding the European integration issue is the only one 
of the three main independent variables that affects both exit and voice to a similar 
degree. The more divided political parties in a country, the less likely are Euro-
sceptic citizens to abstain out of protest and the rather they vote for a Eurosceptic 
party. In party systems with low polarization of EU issues, Eurosceptics show a 
predicted probability of 37.3% to exit and a chance of 11.8% to voice their discon-
tent. However, in countries where parties are highly polarized on European in-
tegration, Eurosceptic individuals have a predicted exit probability of 12.2%, 
while their likelihood to vote for a Eurosceptic party is 35.7%. This finding pro-
vides evidence to the effect of party polarization and EU issue politicization for 
the electoral behavior of dissatisfied citizens. On the other hand, the chances of 
ordinary abstention and voting for another party are not significantly affected by 
elite polarization regarding European integration (see fig. A-6).   
 
4. Discussion 
In this paper, I aimed to understand the factors that shape the electoral behavior 
of Eurosceptic citizens in European Parliament elections. More specifically, I 
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identified the effects that individual political awareness, ideological voter-party 
congruence and party polarization regarding the issue of European integration 
exert on the electoral choice between protest-based abstaining (exit) and voting 
for a Eurosceptic party (voice). Relying on the rational choice theory of electoral 
behavior and employing an integrated approach modelling a simultaneous deci-
sion process, I analyzed a sub-sample of the 2014 EES voter survey and the Eu-
romanifestos dataset from the same EP election. The results indicate that Euro-
sceptic citizens tend to choose voice over exit, when they are more interested and 
knowledgeable in politics, when they feel better represented by Eurosceptic par-
ties and when the issue of European integration is highly polarized by the polit-
ical parties in their country. In addition, the findings show that abstaining out of 
protest is not the same as ordinary abstention. While the latter is mainly caused 
by a lack of political awareness, protest-based abstention is more likely in con-
texts where political parties fail to represent Eurosceptic citizens and do not po-
liticize the issue of European integration.  
These findings have important implications for at least two areas of research, 
namely the political behavior of dissatisfied citizens and the nature of European 
Parliament elections. Regarding the former, the study concludes, first, that dis-
satisfied citizens act in accordance with the assumptions of rational choice theory. 
Greater political awareness enhances electoral participation, as it mobilizes peo-
ple and provides them with the means to identify the party that is most in line 
with their preferences. The implication of this finding is that protest parties ben-
efit when their potential supporters receive more political information. However, 
it might happen that increasing knowledge also leads to decreasing 
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dissatisfaction.61 Second, the results underline that the supply side matters for 
dissatisfied citizens, as they favor ideological congruence and representation, 
even when voting for system-opposing parties (see also Birch & Dennison 2019, 
Hernández 2018).62 Third, the findings confirm the electoral relevance of party 
polarization on single policy issues (see also Lachat 2011). When parties strongly 
diverge on an issue, dissatisfied citizens can better identify parties that match 
their own preferences and express their discontent at the ballot boxes. In conse-
quence, parties have an incentive to take extreme positions on issues that they 
perceive as advantageous in an election, in order to polarize the issue and mobi-
lize voters. 
Addressing the second research area, the results of this study support previous 
findings regarding the changing nature of European Parliament elections (e.g., 
De Vries et al. 2011, Hobolt & Spoon 2012, Hobolt & Wittrock 2011). Nowadays, 
“Europe matters” for many citizens, when they go to the polls. One manifestation 
of this trend is that Eurosceptic citizens vote for Eurosceptic parties and, thus, 
according to their preferences on European integration. This study has identified 
several factors that contribute to their ability of doing so. First, the more infor-
mation people receive during EP election campaigns, the more they are able to 
match parties’ EU positions with their own (see also Beach et al. 2018). Second, 
the availability of ideologically congruent parties is essential for EU issue voting, 
since voters do not only consider EU preferences but also place great emphasis 
on a party’s ideological profile. Left Eurosceptic citizens, for example, hardly vote 
                                                 
61 There is still a lively academic debate about whether and how political knowledge affects peo-
ple’s satisfaction with the political system in the first place (see, e.g., Karp et al. 2003, Osterberg-
Kaufmann 2019). 
62 From the perspective of democratic theory, this can be seen as a positive conclusion, as it con-
firms that “protest voting is therefore fundamentally a political act, not simply an expression of 
disenchantment with politics” (Birch & Dennison 2019: 122). 
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for right-wing Eurosceptic parties, and vice versa (see also Hernández & Kriesi 
2016). Third, voting according to preferences on European integration is still 
highly context-dependent (see also Van Elsas et al. 2018). Where EU issues are 
more politicized by political elites, electoral behavior is more connected to EU 
attitudes and less in accordance with the second-order theory of European Par-
liament elections. Whether or not this trend continues, needs to be addressed by 
future empirical research.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Operationalization of independent variables from the EES 2014 voter 
survey  
Variables Item (EES 2014) Coding 
Dependent variable 
 
Electoral behaviour in the 2014 EP elections (qp1 
and qp2, see below) 
1=Ordinary abstention 
2=Protest-based abstention (exit) 
3=Vote for a Eurosceptic party 
(voice) 
4=Vote for another party 
Ordinary  
abstention 
QP1: “European Parliament elections were 
held on the (insert date according to country). For 
one reason or another, some people in (our 
country) did not vote in these elections. Did 
you yourself vote in the recent European Par-
liament elections?” 
 
QP2: “Which party did you vote for in these 
recent European Parliament elections?” 
1="Did not vote" (QP1) or 
“voted blank” (QP2) 
Protest-based  
abstention (exit) 
QP4b: “What are the main reasons why you 
did NOT vote in the recent European Parlia-
ment elections?” [max. three answers] 
1=Indicated exclusively one or 
(at least) two of the following 
answers: 
- “lack of trust in or dissatisfac-
tion with politics in general” 
- “not really satisfied with the 
European Parliament as an insti-
tution” 
- “opposed to the EU” 
- “vote has no consequences or 
vote does not change anything” 
Vote for a  
Eurosceptic party 
(voice) 
QP2: “Which party did you vote for in these 
recent European Parliament elections?” 
1=Voted for a party that sits in 
one of the following political 
groups (EP): GUE/NGL, ECR, 
EFDD, ENF or a “non-inscrit” 
party (NI) 
Vote for another 
party 
 
QP2: “Which party did you vote for in these 
recent European Parliament elections?” 
1=Voted for a party that sits in 
one of the following political 
groups (EP): EPP, S&D, ALDE, 
GREENS 
Excluded from 
analysis 
 
QP2: “Which party did you vote for in these 
recent European Parliament elections?” 
 
1=“refused”, “don’t know”, 
“other” or voted for a party that 
did not obtain seats in the EP 
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Independent  
Variables 
  
EU support QP7: “Generally speaking, do you think that 
(our country)'s membership of the EU is...?” 
 
QP6: “For each of the following statements, 
please tell me to what extent it corresponds or 
not to your attitude or opinion.” 
- You trust the institutions of the EU (qp6_2) 
- You feel you are a citizen of the EU (qp6_3) 
- You feel attached to Europe (qp6_6) 
 
Combined mean of three sup-
port indicators, that were re-
scaled (to 0-1) beforehand: 
- EU regime support (qp7): 3-
point scale (0=“a bad thing”; 
0.5=“neither a good thing nor a 
bad thing”, 1=“a good thing”) 
- EU institutional trust (qp6_2): 4 
points scale from 0 (“no, not at 
all”) to 1 (“yes, totally”) 
- EU identity (qp6_3, qp6_6): Sum 
index of the two items (7-point 
scale) 
(DK excluded)  
Political  
awareness 
QP6: “For each of the following statements, 
please tell me to what extent it corresponds or 
not to your attitude or opinion”: 
- You are very interested in politics (qp6_1) 
 
QPP23: “For each of the following statements 
about the EU, could you please tell me 
whether you think it is true or false. If you 
don't know, just say so and we will skip to the 
next.” 
- Switzerland is a member of the EU (qpp23_1) 
- Each Member State elects the same number 
of representatives to the European Parliament 
(qpp23_2) 
- There are (150% of correct number) members 
in the (lower house of national parliament) 
(qpp23_3) 
- (Name of the head of government) belongs to 
(name of correct party) (qpp23_4) 
 
QPP24: “For each of the following candidates 
for President of the next European Commis-
sion, can you tell me which European party 
group or which (nationality) political party 
supports their nomination?” 
- Jean-Claude Juncker 
- Martin Schulz 
- Guy Verhofstadt 
Mean of two added items: 
- Subjective political interest 
(qp6_1) measured on 4-point 
scale (0=”no, not at all”; 1=”Yes, 
totally”) 
- Objective political knowledge 
as the mean of seven factual 
knowledge questions (qpp23, 
qpp24), where 1=correct answer; 
0=incorrect answer or “don’t 
know” 
 
 Thus, the indicator ranges 
from 0 (no subjective political 
interest and no knowledge ques-
tion answered correctly) to 1 
(high subjective political interest 
and all knowledge questions an-
swered correctly) 
 
 
Ideological  
distance to the 
closest  
Eurosceptic party 
QPP13: “In political matters people talk of ‘the 
left’ and ‘the right’. What is your position? 
Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' means 
Absolute difference between the 
voter’s own position (qpp13) on 
the ideological left–right scale 
and the position of the closest 
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‘left’ and '10' means ‘right’. Which number best 
describes your position?” 
 
QPP14: “And about where would you place 
the following political parties on this scale? 
How about the...? Which number from 0 to 10, 
where '0' means ‘left’ and '10' means ‘right’ 
best describes this party?” 
 
 
 
national political party (qpp14) 
that sits in one of the following 
political groups (EP): 
GUE/NGL, ECR, EFDD, ENF or 
a “non-inscrit” party (NI) 
 
 Scale ranges from 0 (maxi-
mum ideological distance) to 1 
(absolute ideological congru-
ence), after rescaling (originally 
the scale ran from 0 to 10) 
Internal efficacy QPP9: “For each of the following statements, 
please tell me to what extent it corresponds or 
not to your attitude or opinion.” 
- Sometimes politics and government 
seem so complicated that a person like you 
can’t really understand what’s going on 
(qpp9_3) 
4-point scale from 0 (“yes, to-
tally”) to 1 (“no, not at all”) 
Support for  
national  
government 
(dummy) 
QPP20: “Do you approve or disapprove of 
…?” 
- The (nationality) government’s record to date 
(qpp20_1) 
1=”approve” 
0=”disapprove” 
(DK excluded) 
Left-right self-
placement 
QPP13: In political matters people talk of "the 
left" and the right". What is your position? 
Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' means 
"left" and '10' means "right". Which number 
best describes your position? 
Original 11-point scale rescaled 
to 0-1  
(refusal and “don’t know”  
excluded) 
Mobilized by 
party 
(dummy) 
QP12: “Did anyone from one of the national 
political parties contact you regarding your 
vote in the recent European elections?” 
1=”yes” 
0=”no” 
(DK excluded) 
Mobilized by 
GOTV campaign 
(dummy) 
QP8: “Personally, do you remember having 
seen on TV, in the Internet or on posters, read 
in newspapers or heard on the radio a cam-
paign encouraging people to vote in the Euro-
pean elections?” 
1=”yes, remember” 
0=”no, don’t remember” 
(DK excluded) 
Personal  
economic  
hardship 
QPP11: “Please tell me whether or not each of 
the following situations has happened to you 
or someone in your household during the last 
two years?” 
- You or someone in your household lost his or 
her job (qpp11_1) 
- Your household experienced a decrease in in-
come (qpp11_2) 
 
Mean value of both variables, 
which each have three response 
options: “yes” (1), “no” (0), 
“don’t know” 
 Thus the new scale is: 
1=experienced both kinds of 
economic hardship 
0.5=experienced one form of 
economic hardship 
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0=did not experience economic 
hardship 
(DK excluded) 
Negative  
macro-economic  
evaluations 
QPP15: “What do you think about the econ-
omy? Compared to 12 months ago, do you 
think that the general economic situation in 
(our country) …?” 
Measured on a 5-point scale 
ranging from 0 (”is a lot better”) 
and 1 (“is a lot worse”) 
Party  
identification 
(dummy) 
QPP21: “Do you consider yourself to be close 
to any particular political party? If so, which 
party do you feel close to?” 
 
1=any party is indicated 
0=”no, you do not feel close to 
any political party” 
(refusal and DK excluded) 
No civic duty 
(dummy) 
QP3b: “When did you decide NOT to vote in 
the recent European Parliament elections?” 
- “You never vote” (qp3b_1) 
 
QP4b: “What are the main reasons why you 
did NOT vote in the recent European Parlia-
ment elections?” 
- “Rarely or never vote” (qp4b_13) 
1=either indicated that s/he 
never votes (qp3b_1) or that s/he 
“rarely or never votes” (qp4b_13)  
0=the rest 
 
Female 
(dummy) 
D10: Gender 
 
1=female 
0=male 
Age VD11: “How old are you?” Original scale 
Education D8: How old were you when you stopped full-
time education? 
0="-15" and "no full-time educa-
tion" 
1="16-19" 
2="20-" and "still studying" 
(refusal and DK excluded) 
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Table A-2: Summary statistics of individual level variables for Eurosceptic and 
non-Eurosceptic respondents 
 Eurosceptic Non-Eurosceptic  
Variables Mean SD Mean SD ∆ 
Ordinary abstention (dummy) 0.35 0.47 0.27 0.46 0.08* 
Protest-based abstention (dummy) 0.21 0.40 0.07 0.26 0.14* 
Vote for Eurosceptic party (dummy) 0.15 0.37 0.09 0.28 0.06* 
Vote for other party (dummy) 0.15 0.36 0.42 0.49 -0.31* 
EU support 0.27 0.14 0.75 0.14 -0.48* 
Political awareness 0.39 0.22 0.51 0.23 -0.12* 
Ideological congruence w. Eurosceptic party 0.78 0.23 0.74 0.24 0.04* 
Internal efficacy 0.38 0.35 0.39 0.31 -0.01 
Support for national government (dummy) 0.21 0.40 0.50 0.50 -0.29* 
Left-right self-placement 0.48 0.27 0.52 0.26 -0.04* 
Party identification (dummy) 0.58 0.49 0.69 0.46 -0.11* 
Mobilized by party (dummy) 0.13 0.33 0.15 0.35 -0.02* 
Mobilized by GOTV campaign (dummy) 0.60 0.49 0.76 0.43 -0.15* 
Personal economic hardship 0.48 0.41 0.36 0.40 0.12* 
Macro-economic evaluation 0.64 0.26 0.51 0.24 0.12* 
No civic duty (dummy) 0.18 0.39 0.08 0.26 0.10* 
Age 51.24 17.46 50.90 17.89 0.34 
Female (dummy) 0.54 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.01 
Education 0.52 0.36 0.66 0.35 -0.14* 
Source: EES 2014 (full sample). 
Notes: All variables (except age) range between 0 and 1; * = significant difference of means according to a 
t-test on 99% significance level. 
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Table A-3: Electoral behavior of Eurosceptic citizens (dependent variable) and 
country level independent variables over different EU member states 
Country Electoral behavior of Eurosceptic citizens Independent country level variables 
 Ordin. 
abst. 
Protest-
based 
abst. 
(exit) 
Eurosc. 
voting 
(voice) 
Vote for 
other 
party 
EU  
issue 
polar. 
Comp. 
voting 
Yrs. 
since 
last nat. 
election 
Unemp. 
rate 
(2014) 
Austria 0.38 0.22 0.15 0.11 4.16 0 1 5.6 
Belgium 0.15 0.02 0.18 0.38 1.77 1 0 8.5 
Bulgaria 0.31 0.31 0.02 0.24 1.90 0 1 11.4 
Cyprus 0.23 0.29 0.12 0.11 2.74 1 3 16.1 
Czech Rep. 0.47 0.37 0.04 0.09 2.50 0 1 6.1 
Denmark 0.23 0.05 0.47 0.17 4.22 0 3 6.6 
Finland 0.39 0.22 0.13 0.16 2.27 0 3 8.7 
France 0.47 0.18 0.16 0.07 2.63 0 2 10.3 
Germany 0.31 0.37 0.12 0.11 1.67 0 1 5.0 
Greece 0.12 0.10 0.41 0.09 4.89 1 2 26.5 
Hungary 0.50 0.16 0.08 0.22 1.92 0 0 7.7 
Ireland 0.33 0.09 0.26 0.07 2.15 0 3 11.3 
Italy 0.24 0.19 0.18 0.19 3.93 0 1 12.7 
Latvia 0.40 0.35 0.02 0.16 2.22 0 3 10.8 
Lithuania 0.32 0.11 0.13 0.29 1.63 0 2 10.7 
Netherlands 0.24 0.25 0.30 0.12 2.31 0 2 7.4 
Poland 0.54 0.22 0.15 0.03 3.83 0 3 9.0 
Portugal 0.44 0.16 0.10 0.17 3.36 0 3 14.1 
Slovakia 0.58 0.32 0.01 0.04 2.45 0 2 13.2 
Spain 0.33 0.21 0.11 0.15 2.36 0 3 24.5 
Sweden 0.11 0.12 0.25 0.42 3.00 0 4 7.9 
UK 0.38 0.11 0.30 0.12 2.86 0 4 6.1 
Source: EES 2014, Eurosceptic sub-sample (electoral behavior), Euromanifestos 2014 (party polarization), 
Eurostat (unemployment). 
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Table A-4: Individual level multinomial regression model with control varia-
bles only (DA approach) 
 Protest-based 
abstention vs. 
ordinary  
abstention 
Vote for Euro-
sceptic party 
vs. ordinary  
abstention 
Vote for other 
party vs.  
ordinary  
abstention 
EU support -2.37*** 
(0.44) 
-2.01*** 
(0.55) 
0.95* 
(0.48) 
Left-right self-placement -0.34 
(0.65) 
-2.30* 
(1.01) 
-1.49 
(1.10) 
(Left-right self-placement)² 0.42 
(0.66) 
2.41* 
(1.00) 
1.09 
(0.97) 
Support for national government -0.38** 
(0.14) 
-0.93*** 
(0.21) 
0.01 
(0.15) 
Experienced personal economic hardship 0.39** 
(0.14) 
-0.16 
(0.19) 
-0.16 
(0.15) 
Negative evaluation of macro-economic situation 0.14 
(0.28) 
-0.07 
(0.58) 
-0.03 
(0.32) 
Internal political efficacy 0.23 
(0.18) 
0.61*** 
(0.18) 
0.54*** 
(0.16) 
Party identification -0.22 
(0.11) 
0.68** 
(0.21) 
0.76*** 
(0.19) 
Mobilization by parties 0.10 
(0.16) 
0.88*** 
(0.20) 
0.44* 
(0.19) 
Mobilization by gotv campaigns 0.48** 
(0.17) 
0.51*** 
(0.15) 
0.25 
(0.16) 
Age 0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
(Age)² -0.00*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00** 
(0.00) 
-0.00* 
(0.00) 
Gender (female) -0.19** 
(0.07) 
-0.32* 
(0.13) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
Education 0.36* 
(0.17) 
0.55* 
(0.27) 
0.42 
(0.26) 
No civic duty -0.22* 
(0.09) 
-20.05*** 
(0.30) 
-19.99*** 
(0.28) 
Constant -1.95*** 
(0.49) 
-1.52** 
(0.56) 
-3.37*** 
(0.60) 
Pseudo R2 0.14 
Observations 3,806 
Notes: The observations are Eurosceptic citizens (clustered in 22 countries); the coefficients are logit coef-
ficients that display the effect that an independent variable exerts on the respective outcome category (of 
the dependent variable) versus the base category (here: ordinary abstention); in parentheses are cluster-
corrected standard errors; significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A-5: Individual level multinomial regression model with main independ-
ent and control variables (DA approach) 
 Protest-based 
abstention vs. 
ordinary  
abstention 
Vote for Euro-
sceptic party 
vs. ordinary 
abstention 
Vote for other 
party vs.  
ordinary  
abstention 
Political awareness 1.35*** 
(0.35) 
3.61*** 
(0.35) 
2.22*** 
(0.35) 
Ideological congruence to Eurosceptic parties -0.40 
(0.22) 
2.42*** 
(0.50) 
-1.25*** 
(0.31) 
EU support -2.58*** 
(0.48) 
-2.34*** 
(0.56) 
0.76 
(0.53) 
Left-right self-placement -0.14 
(0.69) 
-1.55 
(1.08) 
-0.83 
(1.00) 
(Left-right self-placement)² 0.21 
(0.68) 
1.73 
(1.07) 
0.38 
(0.83) 
Support for national government -0.39** 
(0.14) 
-0.90*** 
(0.22) 
-0.12 
(0.17) 
Experienced personal economic hardship 0.40** 
(0.14) 
-0.09 
(0.18) 
-0.04 
(0.18) 
Negative evaluation of macro-economic situation 0.19 
(0.26) 
0.00 
(0.49) 
-0.01 
(0.34) 
Internal political efficacy 0.20 
(0.16) 
0.40* 
(0.18) 
0.47** 
(0.16) 
Party identification -0.22 
(0.13) 
0.49* 
(0.22) 
0.84*** 
(0.21) 
Mobilization by parties 0.09 
(0.18) 
0.85*** 
(0.19) 
0.45* 
(0.19) 
Mobilization by gotv campaigns 0.34* 
(0.15) 
0.31* 
(0.13) 
0.29* 
(0.11) 
Age 0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
(Age)² -0.00*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00* 
(0.00) 
Gender (female) -0.13* 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.13) 
0.26** 
(0.09) 
Education 0.20 
(0.18) 
0.17 
(0.25) 
0.11 
(0.30) 
No civic duty -0.08 
(0.10) 
-18.31*** 
(0.31) 
-18.32*** 
(0.28) 
Constant -2.04*** 
(0.46) 
-4.13*** 
(0.82) 
-3.44*** 
(0.58) 
Pseudo R2 0.18 
Observations 3,415 
Notes: The observations are Eurosceptic citizens (clustered in 22 countries); the coefficients are logit coef-
ficients that display the effect that an independent variable exerts on the respective outcome category (of 
the dependent variable) versus the base category (here: ordinary abstention); in parentheses are cluster-
corrected standard errors; significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A-6: Individual and country level model with main independent and 
control variables (DA approach) 
 Protest-based 
vs ord. abstent. 
Eurosc. vote vs 
ordin. abstent. 
Other party vs 
ordin. abstent. 
Political awareness 1.36*** 
(0.33) 
3.52*** 
(0.38) 
2.35*** 
(0.37) 
Ideological congruence to Eurosceptic parties -0.29 
(0.21) 
2.23*** 
(0.51) 
-1.38*** 
(0.30) 
Party system polarization on European integration -0.21** 
(0.07) 
0.34* 
(0.17) 
0.10 
(0.15) 
Compulsory voting 0.48* 
(0.24) 
1.32* 
(0.63) 
-0.06 
(0.45) 
Years since last national election -0.12 
(0.11) 
0.19 
(0.12) 
0.08 
(0.18) 
Unemployment rate (2014) 0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
EU support -2.66*** 
(0.48) 
-2.00*** 
(0.46) 
0.84 
(0.50) 
Left-right self-placement -0.05 
(0.66) 
-2.12* 
(0.93) 
-0.95 
(0.96) 
(Left-right self-placement)² 0.09 
(0.66) 
2.34** 
(0.89) 
0.55 
(0.81) 
Support for national government -0.43*** 
(0.13) 
-0.84*** 
(0.18) 
-0.04 
(0.17) 
Experienced personal economic hardship 0.36* 
(0.15) 
-0.30* 
(0.13) 
-0.14 
(0.13) 
Negative evaluation of macro-economic situation 0.14 
(0.24) 
-0.25 
(0.29) 
-0.10 
(0.33) 
Internal political efficacy 0.20 
(0.16) 
0.33 
(0.18) 
0.42** 
(0.16) 
Party identification -0.20 
(0.13) 
0.42* 
(0.21) 
0.84*** 
(0.21) 
Mobilization by parties 0.09 
(0.18) 
0.59* 
(0.24) 
0.37 
(0.20) 
Mobilization by gotv campaigns 0.33* 
(0.15) 
0.40*** 
(0.11) 
0.30* 
(0.12) 
No civic duty -0.10 
(0.10) 
-18.16*** 
(0.29) 
-18.25*** 
(0.28) 
Age 0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
(Age)² -0.00*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00** 
(0.00) 
Gender (female) -0.14* 
(0.07) 
-0.04 
(0.14) 
0.26** 
(0.09) 
Education 0.21 
(0.17) 
0.16 
(0.21) 
0.20 
(0.24) 
Pseudo R2 0.20 
Observations 3,415 
Notes: The observations are Eurosceptic citizens (clustered in 22 countries); the coefficients are logit coef-
ficients that display the effect that an independent variable exerts on the respective outcome category (of 
the dependent variable) versus the base category (here: ordinary abstention); constant is surpressed; in 
parentheses are cluster-corrected standard errors; significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A-7: Individual level multinomial regression model with central inde-
pendent and control variables (country FE approach) 
 Protest-based 
abstention vs. 
ordinary  
abstention 
Vote for Euro-
sceptic party 
vs. ordinary 
abstention 
Vote for other 
party vs.  
ordinary  
abstention 
Political awareness 1.31*** 
(0.28) 
3.53*** 
(0.31) 
2.34*** 
(0.32) 
Ideological congruence to Eurosceptic parties -0.39 
(0.23) 
2.07*** 
(0.31) 
-1.58*** 
(0.25) 
EU support -2.65*** 
(0.37) 
-1.45*** 
(0.41) 
1.07* 
(0.44) 
Left-right self-placement -0.24 
(0.62) 
-3.36*** 
(0.69) 
-0.90 
(0.68) 
(Left-right self-placement)² 0.43 
(0.59) 
3.44*** 
(0.67) 
0.65 
(0.67) 
Support for national government -0.43*** 
(0.13) 
-0.83*** 
(0.16) 
-0.07 
(0.14) 
Experienced personal economic hardship 0.35** 
(0.13) 
-0.29 
(0.15) 
-0.08 
(0.15) 
Negative evaluation of macro-economic situation 0.13 
(0.23) 
0.20 
(0.26) 
-0.11 
(0.26) 
Internal political efficacy 0.17 
(0.15) 
0.26 
(0.18) 
0.28 
(0.18) 
Party identification -0.22* 
(0.11) 
0.40** 
(0.13) 
0.73*** 
(0.14) 
Mobilization by parties 0.14 
(0.18) 
0.38* 
(0.17) 
0.33 
(0.18) 
Mobilization by gotv campaigns 0.29** 
(0.11) 
0.42*** 
(0.12) 
0.29* 
(0.12) 
No civic duty -0.13 
(0.12) 
-19.43 
(1,142.54) 
-19.57 
(1,365.52) 
Age 0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.08*** 
(0.02) 
(Age)² -0.00*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00* 
(0.00) 
-0.00** 
(0.00) 
Gender (female) -0.15 
(0.10) 
-0.05 
(0.12) 
0.26* 
(0.12) 
Education 0.20 
(0.17) 
0.22 
(0.18) 
0.13 
(0.18) 
Belgium -0.13 
(16,079.92) 
21.45 
(9,452.33) 
20.79 
(9,452.33) 
Bulgaria 0.77* 
(0.38) 
-0.75 
(0.62) 
1.62*** 
(0.42) 
Cyprus 0.62 
(0.36) 
0.49 
(0.42) 
0.41 
(0.42) 
Czech Republic 0.61* 
(0.26) 
-1.33*** 
(0.39) 
-0.08 
(0.35) 
Denmark -0.68 
(0.43) 
0.96** 
(0.35) 
0.40 
(0.39) 
Finland 0.34 
(0.31) 
-0.31 
(0.36) 
0.34 
(0.37) 
France -0.51 
(0.31) 
-0.60 
(0.34) 
-0.34 
(0.38) 
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Germany 0.82** 
(0.30) 
0.24 
(0.36) 
0.20 
(0.39) 
Greece 0.10 
(0.35) 
1.95*** 
(0.32) 
1.35*** 
(0.37) 
Hungary -0.47 
(0.36) 
-0.85* 
(0.43) 
0.30 
(0.37) 
Ireland -0.30 
(0.42) 
1.28*** 
(0.37) 
0.21 
(0.49) 
Italy 0.42 
(0.34) 
0.95** 
(0.33) 
1.60*** 
(0.35) 
Latvia 0.31 
(0.31) 
-1.59** 
(0.54) 
0.02 
(0.39) 
Lithuania -0.18 
(0.44) 
0.19 
(0.43) 
1.03* 
(0.41) 
The Netherlands 0.74* 
(0.34) 
0.82* 
(0.36) 
0.32 
(0.41) 
Poland -0.25 
(0.38) 
-0.11 
(0.42) 
-1.32 
(0.69) 
Portugal -0.19 
(0.30) 
-0.32 
(0.34) 
0.81* 
(0.33) 
Slovakia 0.19 
(0.28) 
-3.86*** 
(1.04) 
-1.30** 
(0.44) 
Spain 0.38 
(0.30) 
0.17 
(0.36) 
1.18** 
(0.36) 
Sweden 0.64 
(0.39) 
1.00* 
(0.39) 
2.37*** 
(0.39) 
United Kingdom -0.84* 
(0.35) 
1.05*** 
(0.32) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
Constant -2.15*** 
(0.57) 
-4.34*** 
(0.66) 
-4.11*** 
(0.68) 
Pseudo R2 0.26 
Observations 3,415 
Notes: The observations are Eurosceptic citizens; the coefficients are logit coefficients that display the effect 
that an independent variable exerts on the respective outcome category (of the dependent variable) versus 
the base category (here: ordinary abstention); in parentheses are standard errors (not clustered); signifi-
cance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A-8: Predicting the choice between ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ with different mod-
elling approaches (results of three binary logistic regression models) 
 DA SE  
approach 
Country FE 
model 
Multi-level 
model 
Political awareness 1.97*** 
(0.53) 
1.98*** 
(0.39) 
1.95*** 
(0.39) 
Ideological congruence to Eurosceptic parties 2.53*** 
(0.51) 
2.44*** 
(0.39) 
2.45*** 
(0.39) 
Party polarization on European integration 0.55** 
(0.19) 
 
 
0.39 
(0.33) 
EU support 0.62 
(0.54) 
1.73** 
(0.53) 
1.60** 
(0.52) 
Support for national government -0.41 
(0.26) 
-0.39 
(0.22) 
-0.37 
(0.22) 
Experienced personal economic hardship -0.62*** 
(0.17) 
-0.52** 
(0.20) 
-0.53** 
(0.20) 
Negative evaluation of macro-economic situation -0.43 
(0.33) 
0.09 
(0.35) 
0.06 
(0.34) 
Left-right self-placement -2.35* 
(1.10) 
-4.69*** 
(0.95) 
-4.45*** 
(0.93) 
(Left-right self-placement)² 2.65* 
(1.14) 
4.85*** 
(0.92) 
4.59*** 
(0.90) 
Party identification 0.73*** 
(0.17) 
0.77*** 
(0.17) 
0.77*** 
(0.16) 
Mobilization by parties 0.51 
(0.29) 
0.22 
(0.22) 
0.24 
(0.22) 
Mobilization by gotv campaigns 0.11 
(0.19) 
0.18 
(0.17) 
0.17 
(0.17) 
Internal political efficacy 0.14 
(0.21) 
-0.04 
(0.23) 
-0.01 
(0.22) 
Age -0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
(Age)² 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Gender (female) 0.04 
(0.14) 
0.04 
(0.15) 
0.04 
(0.15) 
Education 0.08 
(0.22) 
0.21 
(0.24) 
0.21 
(0.23) 
Compulsory Voting 0.95 
(0.75) 
 
 
2.26* 
(1.07) 
Years since last national election 0.43* 
(0.19) 
 
 
0.30 
(0.26) 
Unemployment -0.02 
(0.03) 
 
 
-0.08 
(0.06) 
Country dummies Not included Included Not included 
Observations 1,401 1,393 1,401 
Notes: The dependent variable is the binary choice between protest-based abstention (0=‘exit’) and voting 
for a Eurosceptic party (1=‘voice’); displayed are logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses (for 
the DA approach, the standard errors are corrected for the country clusters); significance levels: * p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.   
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Figure A-1: Electoral behavior among Eurosceptic citizens (distribution of the 
dependent variable) 
 
Source: EES 2014, Eurosceptic sub-sample (n=7,006 from 22 countries) 
 
Figure A-2: Mean values of main independent variables over electoral choices 
 
Source: EES 2014, Eurosceptic sub-sample (n=7,006 from 22 countries)  
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Figure A-3: Distribution of central independent variables among all respond-
ents and among Eurosceptic respondents 
 
Source: EES 2014, full sample (left side) and Eurosceptic sub-sample (right side). 
 
Figure A-4: Predicted probabilities for four electoral choices among Eurosceptic 
citizens in function of individual political awareness 
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Figure A-5: Predicted probabilities for four electoral choices among Eurosceptic 
citizens in function of ideological congruence with Eurosceptic parties 
 
 
Figure A-6: Predicted probabilities for four electoral choices among Eurosceptic 
citizens in function of party polarization on European integration 
 
